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"A self-respecting and self-supporting democracy can plead no
justification for the existence of child labor."
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 24, 1937'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Comprehensive legislative and regulatory proscriptions on employment
of minors in both the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States
reflect the general public presumption that children have both rights and
needs that are particular to them.2 Both countries have compulsory school
laws, separate judicial systems for minors charged with violations of the
law,3 and elaborate judicial scrutinies meant to protect the best interests of
the child in custody disputes.4 Additional legal protections for minors in the

1. H.R. Doc. No. 255, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937).
2. For an exposition on the special status of children that vests them with additional
rights, see Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J.
1860, 1878 (1987).
3. Germany's federal statute governing criminal responsibility of those under age 18 is
the Jugendgerichtsgesetz [JugGG], 1974 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] 3427. Each of
the 50 states of the United States has a juvenile code. These statutes usually establish procedural and substantive law applicable to minors' acts that would be criminal if an adult
committed them. In addition, these codes govern so-called "status" offenses, or acts which
are illegal only when minors committed them (i.e., truancy or curfew laws). Typically, these
same courts also have jurisdiction over offenses committed against minors, such as abuse or
neglect.
4. For an application of this principle by a California court, see Stewart v. Stewart, 278
P.2d 441, 445 (1955). In Germany, federal statutory law directs family courts in divorce cases
to determine the custody of a minor child in accordance with the welfare and interests of the
child. (The court's ruling must be one "die dem Wohle des Kindes am besten entsprecht," or
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industrial setting also respond to the position that the state has the power and
the duty to promote the welfare of the young because of children's incapacity
to always act in their own best interests.5
Labor statutes in the two countries differ fundamentally. Two major
distinctions are Germany's works councils and co-determination, neither of
which have a corresponding requirement for United States employers.
German employers with at least five employees must comply with legislation
6 with which
empowering workers to establish a works council (Betriebsrat),
the employer must consult prior to executing many significant management
decisions. The Codetermination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz) requires a
German company with 2000 or more employees to provide for labor
representation equal to that of shareholders on the supervisory board
(Aufsichtsrat) which appoints and supervises the German corporation's
counterpart to a United States corporation's board of directors.7 A third
difference is the absence of the German employer's legal duty to bargain
with a union officially representing workers, 8 a statutory requirement since
1935 for the employer in the United States. 9
Fourth, German law affecting working women is quite different from
United States law. Although federal law in the United States prohibits sex
discrimination in employment, 10 German statutes display a paternalistic
attitude toward the female worker. She is provided more frequent and longer
breaks than her male colleagues," permitted less overtime work," limited
as to which hours she might work, 13 and forbidden from working in
capacities deemed dangerous, such as the mining, iron, steel, and construction
industries.' 4
which best corresponds with the interests of the child.) Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB]
§ 1671, 1896 Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI.] 195, BGBI. III 402.
5. This parenspatriaedoctrine, or the principle that, when necessary, the state must act
in a parental role to the young, is the basis both for statutes creating juvenile courts and for
those establishing standards in custody disputes. See Developments in the Law-the
Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1199 (1980) (exploring this duty of the
state from the perspective of a divorce court judge).
6. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG], 1988 BGBI. I 2261.
7. Mitbestimmungsgesetz [MitbG], 1976 BGB1. 1 1153.
8. See Manfred Weiss, Federal Republic of Germany, in 5 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 29, 128 (Roger Blanpain
ed., 1986).
9. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d)(1988).
10. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1991)).
11. Arbeitszeitsordnung [AZO] §§ 12, 2, & 18, 1, 1938 RGBI. I 447.
12. Id. § 17.
13. Id. § 19, 1.

14. See Carol D.Rasnic, Germany's Legal ProtectionforWomen Workers vis-a-vis Illegal
Employment Discrimination in the United States: A Comparative Perspective in Light of
Johnson Controls, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 415, 419 (1992).
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Finally, German federal law protects workers from termination without
cause. 15 Most U.S. states still apply the general rule that the employment
contract is terminable at any time at the will of either party, with or without
reason.16
This essay analyzes the federal child labor laws of Germany and the
United States in an attempt to ascertain whether similarly extreme distinctions
are evident in this area as well. The two bodies of law will be compared
according to: (1) businesses or employers subject to the laws; (2) individuals
protected; (3) exemptions or exceptions; (4) types of work prohibited for
minors and scope of restrictions and duties on employers; and (5) penalties
for violations and enforcement procedures. 7 A study of Germany's statute
18 and the child
protecting the minor worker (Jugendarbeitsschutzgesetz)
labor provisions of the United States' Fair Labor Standards Act 9 clearly
supports the inference that child labor laws in the two countries are uniquely
similiar among otherwise disparate labor legislations.
II.

HISTORY AND PURPOSES OF THE STATUTES

A. Germany
The history of governmental protection for working minors in Europe is
closely intertwined with the introduction of manufacturing. The beginning
of the use of machinery in the workplace - in England about 1750, and in
Germany around 1800 - brought with it the exploitation of all workers,
including the young.2" The building of modem capitalism took its toll,
exacting many human victims, and the adage that "die Ware Arbeitskraft nur
in Behaltern aus Fleisch und Blut gibt '21 expressed the general posture of
management.
Even as early as the Middle Ages, the use of the young in the labor

15. Kundigungsschutzgesetz [KSchG] § 1, 1969 BGBI. 1 1317.
16. See generally Michael A. Di Sabatino, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule that
Employers May Discharge At-Will Employee for Any Reason, 12 A.L.R. 544 (1984). It is
conceded that courts in many states increasingly are recognizing a variety of exceptions to this
rule. See John D. Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of
Employment at Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467 (1980).
17. It is axiomatic that some basic dissimilarities will be attributable to differences in
governmental structures. When this is the case, the variation will be noted as functional, rather
than substantive.
18. Jugendarbeitsschutzgesetz[JArbSchG], 1976 BGBI. 1965, amended by Erstes Gesetz
zur Anderung des Jugendarbeitsschutzgesetzes, 1984 BGBI. 1 1277.
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1989).
20. HANNS BRAUSER & MICHAEL SCHODEN, JUGENDARBEITSSCHUTZGESETZ: KOMMENTAR
FOR DIE PRAXIS 15 (1979).
21. Id. A rough translation of this phrase is: "The commodities produced use workers only
as containers of flesh and blood."
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market went virtually unchallenged. Prior to the advent of manufacturing,
however, children for the most part labored on farms, usually for parents or
neighbors.22 Traditional society viewed children simply as "small adults,"
with no separate or special status.
Indeed, their small stature often
compensated in the workplace for their limited strength, particularly in
narrow places such as mines where children were able to work where a
grown worker's size was prohibitive.24
Until the mid-1800s the general European view was that childhood
concluded at about age ten or eleven, so any protection of the child worker
thus referred only to the very young.25 Early child labor laws in Europe
pertained to specific industries, the first being the 1284 regulation in Venice
making eight the minimum age for work in glass cutting. Similarly, in
Germany there were minimum ages for certain occupations, such as the
sixteenth century NUmberg law restricting work in bookbinding to those aged
fourteen and above.26
In 1839, Prussia adopted labor restrictions for children under the age of
sixteen. The regulations marked the first general restriction on child labor
in any part of what is now Germany. 27 Prior to the enactment of these
laws, abuses of the availability of children in the workplace were rampant.
Although no official statistics for the period before 1850 exist, numerous
eyewitness accounts described appalling conditions. In fabric houses, fiveyear-olds worked fifteen-hour days with only a one-hour pause. Some
children worked with textiles from 5 a.m. until noon, and again from 1 p.m.
until late evening. In the iron and steel industries, employers distributed
alcohol to children to alleviate thirst caused by contaminants that were
permanently damaging their lungs. Such hazardous work conditions were not
unusual. Many very young children worked in environments such as match
factories, where explosions posed a danger; some labored in weaving
factories where dust and noise caused frequent dizzy spells; others toiled in
mines where small work areas resulted in severe bending of their legs, feet
and spinal columns.28
Prussia's 1839 mandate (Prussian Decree on Employment of Young
Workers) forbade any work by those under the age of nine. In addition, the
mandate limited work days to ten hours and prohibited work between the

22. Id. at 15-16.
23. Id. at 15.
24. Id.
25. Id. There was at that time no stage corresponding to the present German law's
category of "Jugendliche" (adolescents, or those ages 14-18). See infra notes 87-90 and
accompanying text.
26. BRAUSER & SCHRODEN, supra note 20, at 16.
27. Id. at 15.
28. Id.at 16-17.
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hours of 11 p.m. and 5 a.m., or on Sundays or holidays by any persons under
age sixteen. The mandate even required that employers provide child
laborers with a one-hour midday rest period and fifteen minute breaks each
morning and afternoon. Finally, the mandate initiated the maintenance of an
official governmental list of names and ages of all workers sixteen and under.
Violations were punishable as criminal offenses.2 9
In 1853 Prussia strengthened the regulations to prohibit all work by those
under the age of twelve. For children ages twelve to fourteen, the revised
legislation provided for six-hour work days, forbade work between 10:30
p.m. and 5:30 a.m., and increased the mandatory morning and afternoon
pauses to one half-hour each. Finally, the 1853 changes introduced the
The Norddeutschen
practice of governmental factory inspections. 3'
Bundesstaaten (North German Federal Government) officially adopted these
regulations in 1869. 31
In 1891, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck initiated the first Work Protection
Statute (Arbeitsschutzgeset) 32 effective during the First Reich. The most
important addition that the 1891 law made to the earlier regulations was to
proscribe children from working as long as they still had school obligations.
law took effect, an estimated 532,000 children were working
At the time the
33
in Germany.
The 1903 Child Protection Law (Kinderschutzgesetz)34 expanded the
earlier protections beyond factory employment to cover retail-, guesthouse-,
and traffic-related work. This law continued to forbid persons under. age
twelve from working, but also prohibited night work for those ages twelve
to sixteen, and limited work by all under age sixteen to three hours per day.
Moreover, the law proscribed work in dangerous occupations for all under
sixteen. 3 ' The German government thus had made many strides in the area
of child labor. The onset of World War I, however, forced the government
to shift its priorities.
During World War I, the German government eased all statutory work
protections, including those applicable to the young. At war's end, the newly
installed German government faced considerable labor strife. The 1918

29. Id. at 18.
30. Id. at 19 (originally requiring the consent of the employer, but made mandatory by
revisions in 1878).
31. Id.
32. 1891 RGBI. 261. An excellent article describing this statute at length is Hermann
Reichold, Der "Neue Kurs" von 1890 und das Recht der Arbeit: Gewerbegerichte,
Arbeitsschutz, Arbeitsordnung, 21 ZEITScHRIFT FTR ARBEITSRECHT 5 (1990). This article
discusses the portion of the law regulating child labor particularly well. Id. at 26-33.
33. BRAUSER & SCHODEN, supra note 20, at 20-21.
34. 1903 RGBI. 313.
35. BRAUSER & SCHODEN, supra note 20, at 21.
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November Revolution culminated in the eight-hour day both for blue-collar
workers (Arbeiter)36 and white-collar workers (Angestellten),3 ' and made
no distinction between children and adults.
The Nationalsozialismus (Nazi) era of Adolf Hitler actually produced
laws facially more protective for child workers. Nazi laws prohibited all
work by those under age fourteen, and the age at which coverage under the
laws terminated was increased from sixteen to eighteen. The laws also
required employers to give minors a twelve- to fifteen-day vacation from
work. Moreover, the Nazis expanded the scope of covered employers to
include forestry, sea, and fishery work, all previously exempted. In reality,
however, these laws were not enforced, particularly after the onset of World
War 11.31

After World War II, German unions demanded an effective statute for
The government was slow to react. The German
minor workers.
39
government's first post-war effort was the 1960 Jugendarbeitsschutzgesetz,
which divided minors into two groups: (a) children (Kinder), comprised of
all under age fourteen; and (b) adolescents (Jugendliche), ages fourteen
through seventeen. The general rule forbade Kinder from working. The
work week was limited to forty hours for Jugendliche under sixteen, and to
forty-four hours for those sixteen through seventeen. This statute also
prohibited all assembly-line and piece work for all Jugendliche and
practice of requiring a physician's examination for all working
introduced the
40
Jugendliche.
The general view persisted, however, that the 1960 law also was
ineffective because of the numerous exceptions and the lack of a satisfactory
enforcement mechanism. 41 Those demanding a tighter statute cited the
50,000 recorded violations per year in support of their position. Many
insisted that, in fact, the actual number was closer to 100,000.42
Mounting criticism of the deficiencies in the statute made a revised and
stricter law inevitable. Despite considerable opposition from management,
the German parliament (Bundestag) passed the present law on January 23,
1976. 43 The 1976 law was not achieved without controversy. Bills
approved by the Bundestag must also be voted upon by the second chamber
of the German legislature, the Bundesrat,which represents the several states
(Ldnder). However, if the Bundesrat disapproves, generally the Bundestag
36. 1918 RGBI. 1334.

37. 1919 RGBI 315.
38. BRAUSER & SCHODEN, supra note 20, at 21.
39. JArbSchG, 1960 BGBI. 1 1665.

40. See infra notes 294-328 and accompanying text.
41. BRAUSER & SCHODEN, supra note 20, at 23.
42. Id.

43. Id. at 24. Surprisingly, the bill received only one negative vote.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

7

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 1

[Vol. 8

might then override. 44 Because some of the Bundeslander attempted to
weaken the proposed statute, a conciliation committee was formed, which
successfully resolved the differences. The Bundesrat voted its consent on
April 9, 1976,45 and the new Jugendarbeitsschutzgesetzbecame effective on
May 8, 1976.46
Germany's directives from the several international organizations to
which it belongs should not be overlooked. In 1964, Germany adopted by
law 7 the recommendation of the 1961 European Social Charter with regard
to the protection of working minors. The Charter suggested fifteen as the
minimum age for employment, other than for limited work. Other proposed
regulations included: (1) a prohibition of work which would interfere with
school obligations; (2) the requirement of at least three weeks paid vacation
per year; (3) a prohibition on night work (unless an exception justified it); (4)
a prohibition on overtime work; and (5) the requirement of at least twelve
hours rest overnight for all under eighteen. a Further, the March 1965,
recommendation of the European Council 49 listed types of work characterized as dangerous for workers under the age of eighteen.
The European Economic Community's recommendation of January 31,
1967,50 affirmed setting the minimum working age at fifteen, as did the
International Labor Organization (hereinafter ILO).5" This latter agreement
committed the signatory nations to enact laws establishing as the minimum
age for employment either fifteen, or whenever one's legal school obligation

44' GRLrNDGESETZ [Constitution] [hereinafter GG] art. 74 (F.R.G.). Laws affecting
citizenship in the states ("Ldnder") or payments and pensions for public servants require
consent of the Bundesrat. GG art. 73. Indeed, all bills approved by the Bundestag require a
vote by the Bundesrat, but the Bundestag can override any objections with a majority vote.
Since the Bundestag would already have given the measure majority support in its first vote,
the "overriding" process is largely one of form. This procedure makes the so-called "consent"
of the Bundesrat primarily an advisory one.
45. BRAUSER & SCHODEN, supra note 20, at 24.
46. 1976 BGB1. I 965.
47. Zustimmungsgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1964 BGBI. 11 12161.
48. Europaische Sozialcharta v.. 18 Okt. 1961.
49. Empfehlung AP (65) 3 des Europartes vom Marz, 1965. The other member nations
in the European Council at the time were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and Great Britain.
50. Empfehlung der Kommission der Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft vom 31 Jan.
1967 (A BI. EG vom 13 Feb. 1976, S. 405/67) an die Mitgliedstaaten zum
Jugendarbeitsschutz (67/125/EWG). Newly admitted member states by 1967 were Denmark,
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Great Britain.
51. Empfehlung 146 des Internationalen Arbeitsorganization (International Labor
Organization, or "ILO") vom 26 Juni 1973 betreffend das Mindestalter fur die Zulassung zur
Beschaftigung (Stellungnahme der Bundesregierung zur Empfehlung in BT-Drucks 7/2685,
S. 19).
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ends, whichever occurred later.5 2 The ILO directive exempted work
presenting physical or moral danger from53 coverage, and proposed that the
minimum age for such work be eighteen.
B.

The United States

Relative to Germany, the federal child labor laws in the United States
have a recent origin. Although state legislative activity in the area began
considerably earlier, Congress' first effort to regulate child labor was not
until 1916. As in Europe, the Industrial Revolution eventually paved the
way for national child labor legislation in the United States. Early American
industrialists espoused the economic view that productivity should take
priority over worker welfare. 5 Resulting abuses of workers, particularly
children, led to reform campaigns. Reformers established groups such as the
National Child Labor Committee, which published brochures depicting
graphic and compelling evidence of defilement of minors in the labor market
to highlight the injustices and to lobby for laws protecting minors.5 6 In
short, the campaign described conditions much like those that had generated
the first child labor laws in Germany.
Several states initially assumed the burden of regulating child labor, and
every state still has a child labor statute.
The decision to establish a
federal policy was in response to the economic need for the states to compete
on a level playing field. Because businesses maintained the leverage of
moving plants to states with more lenient labor regulations in order to
conserve costs, state legislatures were subject to the pressure to retain their
states' competetitive edges. This situation made the need for federal
regulation of child labor apparent.5 8
It was in this setting - not unlike that of mid-nineteenth and early
twentieth century Germany - that Congress approved the Federal Child
Labor Law of 1916.59 The law forbade the shipment in interstate commerce

52. Exceptions allowing a minimum age of 14 could be granted for member nations in
economic difficulties and with underdeveloped school systems, after a hearing before
participating nations' employee and employer groups. When these exceptions were granted,
those countries were required to present plans for implementing a minimum age of 15. Id.
53. Texts of these international documents are in ERICH MOLITOR ET AL.,
JUGENDARBEITSSCHUTZGESETZ, KOMMENTAR 576-602 (3d ed. 1986).
54. Federal Child Labor Law, 39 Stat. 675 (ch. 432) (1916).
55. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
56. NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMITrEE (1922). This association compiled several
pamphlets on this subject for public distribution.
57. See Note, Child LaborLaws-Time to Grow Up, 59 MINN. L. REV. 575, app. (1975).
This article addresses the state statutes and their analogies to the federal law.
58. See Comment, Child Labor Legislation-Its Past, Present and Future, 7 FORD. L.
REV. 217, 220 (1938).

59. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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of any goods produced by factories or mines which employed child labor.
However, the federal-state balance of powers basic to government in the
United States gave rise to a conflict when opponents of the law argued that
Congress had overstepped its authority. The statute was thus short-lived, for
the U.S. Supreme Court, in Hammer v. Dagenhart,° held it unconstitutional
only a little more than a year after its passage.
Ironically, the challenging party in Dagenhart was the father of two
young boys. The father petitioned the Court to declare the law invalid so
that his sons could work in harsh conditions in a North Carolina cotton mill.
A bare majority of the Court (five to four) held that the law was an
unconstitutional attempt by Congress to exercise its Commerce Clause
powers6 to prohibit the means of production, rather than movement in
commerce itself.
The Court distinguished its earlier decisions upholding legislative
regulation of commerce, citing the actual necessity of the use of interstate
transportation to accomplish harmful results in those cases.62 The majority
reasoned that regulation of the ages at which children might work is
independent from the actual transportation, which did not occur until after the
act the statute regulated.63 Further, the Dagenhart Court viewed a state's
regulation of its internal trade and affairs as within the purview of the Tenth
Amendment police powers reserved to the states.64
Justice Holmes' visionary dissent insisted that Congress' power to
regulate commerce was unqualified under the Constitution.65 With regard
to any possible interference with powers belonging solely to the states,
Holmes agreed that states could "regulate their internal affairs and their
domestic commerce," but added that "when they seek to ' send their products
across the state line they are no longer within this right. "6
Congress proved steadfast in its efforts to establish boundaries on the use
of child labor, and its subsequent attempt, the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 (FLSA), has survived. 67 The FLSA is actually a comprehensive law
that addresses general minimum wages and overtime pay in addition to child

60. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
62. Dagenhart,247 U.S. at 271. The Court distinguished Caminetti v. United States 242
U.S. 470 (1917), where it had upheld the use of Commerce Clause powers to prohibit the
transportation of women in interstate commerce for "purposes of debauchery and kindred
purposes," and Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917), where
such power was held appropriate in regulating the interstate movement of intoxicating liquor.
Id.
63. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. at 272.
64. Id. at 274.
65. Id. at 277 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 281. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
67. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1988) [hereinafter FLSA].
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labor.
The FLSA was also challenged as an unconstitutional use of commerce
clause powers in United States v. F W Darby Lumber Co.,68 but the Court
unanimously upheld the law. As in Dagenhart,the company in Darby had
engaged in a manufacturing process with the intent to later ship the finished
product in interstate commerce. The employer acquired raw materials in one
state and produced lumber to be transported across state lines. The employer
was indicted after it had failed to pay the minimum wage required by the
statute. Citing Dagenhart,the federal district court quashed the indictment
and the government appealed.69
Expressly overruling Dagenhart,70 and referring to Justice Holmes'
dissent in that case as "powerful and now classic,"'" the Darby Court called
the Dagenhartholding a "departure from the principles which have prevailed
in the interpretation of the commerce clause both before and since the ...
decision and that its ... vitality, as a precedent ... has long been exhausted."72 With Darby, a case factually involving no child labor dispute, the
Court approved the 1938 law in its entirety, including those portions
restricting child labor. Although some critics have labelled the federal child
labor legislation in the United States archaic and in need of revision or
repeal,73 the child labor provisions of the FLSA have remained virtually
unchanged since their enactment.
Historically, any changes in Germany's regulations have regarded the
minimum and maximum work ages, the permissible hours of employment,
and the prohibited work activities. In contrast with the United States, there
have been no intrinsic objections to child labor legislation in principle. Yet
despite any distinctions in the chronicle of developments, both countries
currently enforce federal laws addressing concerns over minors in the
workforce: the 1976 Jugendarbeitsschutzgesetz(JArbSchG)and the 1938 Fair
Labor Standards Act's (FLSA) child labor provisions.

68.
69.
70.
71.

312 U.S. 100 (1941).
Id. at 108.
Id. at 117.
Id.at 115.

72. Id. at 116-17.
73. See Note, supra note 57, at 578-82 (stating that laws protecting all workers' safety,
such as OSHA, render obsolete the need to shield the young employee from hazards of the
workplace and concluding that restrictions which both federal and state child labor laws
impose on working minors hinder, rather than benefit them).
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III.

GERMANY'S JUGENDARBEITSSCHUTZGESETZ AND THE UNITED
STATES' FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY

A.

Businesses Subject to the Statutes

The businesses covered under the two, laws is a primary example of the
conclusion that any differences between the United States and Germany are
attributable solely to variants in governmental structures. The JArbSchG
applies to any employer who employs a person protected by the statute.74
The FLSA meanwhile applies only to employers which meet either of two
tests: (1) an "enterprise" test or (2) an "employer" test.75
The primary determinant in the enterprise test is the company's gross
volume of sales. Only those enterprises engaged in interstate commerce or
the production of goods for interstate commerce and which have minimal
annual sales of 500,000 dollars are covered.76 This test does not rest on the
duties of any particular employee, but rather views the issue of coverage
from the perspective of the business.
The employer test, however, covers any employee that engages in
77
interstate commerce or the production of goods for interstate commerce.
Because the touchstone of Congress' power to enact such legislation is the
Commerce Clause, the critical factor for coverage is a showing of a
significant impact by either the business or the affected employee on
interstate commerce.
The federal law in the United States does not preempt the field of child
labor legislation. Indeed, it expressly empowers the states to enact stricter
child labor laws. 78 Substantively, state laws have been modeled after the
federal statute,7 9 so there is basic similarity in the provisions. In the event
the state law is stricter or more favorable to the protected person, or if there
are insufficient connections to interstate commerce to invoke application of
the FLSA, the state statute governs.80 Because of this latter feature, the
result is that virtually all employers are subject either to the federal law or
to a state law which is at least as restrictive. Thus, the question of coverage
under the United States statute is essentially academic.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
by the

JArbSchG § 3, 1960 BGBI. 1 1665.
FLSA § 203(s).
Id. The 1989 amendments increased this figure from $250,000.
Id.
Id. § 218(a).
Most are drafted according to the Uniform Child Labor Law, initially recommended
appropriate national body in COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, SECOND

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON A UNIFORM CILD LABOR LAW (1911).

80. See Alaska Int'l Indus. v. Musarra, 602 P.2d 1240 (Alaska 1979).
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The separation of powers in Germany is far less complex than in the
United States. Germany also has a federal government, but its structure is
considerably different from that of the United States. First, the potential
exists for the German federal legislature (Bundestag)to preempt most subject
matters. The Basic Law (Grundgesetz) lists eleven matters over which the
Bundestag has exclusive powers,8 1 and twenty-four matters over which the
states (Lander) have powers concurrent with those of the Bundestag.82 The
Lander may enact laws in a concurrent area, however, only if the federal
body has not exercised its legislative power. In fact, because the Bundestag
has used these powers extensively, the federal law regulates most significant
matters.8" The major areas which have remained under the control of the
Lander are culture, education, and public safety."
One legal scholar has characterized the German form of federalism as a
"centralistic state which grants some of its powers to the Ldnder."8 5
Nonetheless, the Ldinder exercise substantial power because their courts
actually apply and enforce not only their own statutes, but also the same
federal laws as are enforced by the federal courts." There is an absence of
a federal-Lander competitive dichotomy in Germany, which is in sharp
contrast with U.S. state legislatures and Congress.
Since U.S. state child labor laws quite similar to the federal law apply to
businesses not subject to the FLSA, the question of coverage is usually not
material. The result is that there is no essential distinction between the two
laws with respect to which businesses are covered.
B.

Protected Persons
1. JArbSchG

The JArbSchG applies to all persons under age eighteen. 87 The statute
then further divides those protected into two major categories: (1) children
(Kinder), which includes all those up to age fourteen (i.e., thirteen and
under); and (2) adolescents (Jugendliche), which includes those fourteen to
eighteen years old (i.e., ages fourteen through seventeen).88 German law

81. GG art. 73.
82. Id. at art. 74.
83. The Legal System of Germany, in MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS 3.110.12, § 1.2(G)

(Kenneth R. Redden ed., 1990).
84. Federal Republic of Germany: Constitution and Structure, Press and Info. Office of
the Fed. Gov't. (1989).
85. MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 83, at 3.110.12,
§ 1.2(F).
86. Id. at 3.110.20, § 1.3(C)(1).
87. JArbSchG § 1, 1, 1960 BGB1. I 1665.
88. Id. § 2.
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thus basically forbids work performed by Kinder 9 and strictly regulates
work performed by Jugendliche.90
Expressly included within the concept of Kinder are all those under age
eighteen with any remaining full-time school obligations.9' This classification is a "legal fiction" 92 created to avoid a minor's being burdened
simultaneously with two probable full-time duties such as school and
work. 93 The effect is to expand the concept of Kinder to include many
fifteen-year-olds and even some sixteen-year-olds. 9 The potential scope of
Jugendliche is also broadened to include persons over the age of eighteen
who still have remaining school obligations in one of the many vocational
institutes (Berufsschule) widely used in the German public schools. 95
2.

FLSA

The FLSA consistently employs the word "children" for all those under
age eighteen, without making any distinction between younger children and
those who have reached adolescence. 96 The Act does, however, provide for
separations according to an age scale within its definition of forbidden
' and
"oppressive child labor"97
in its qualifications as to conditions imposed
on permitted work.98 There are four groups: (a) sixteen- to eighteen-yearolds (i.e., ages sixteen and seventeen); (b) fourteen- to sixteen-year-olds (i.e.,
ages fourteen and fifteen); (c) twelve- to fourteen-year-olds (i.e., ages twelve
and thirteen); and (d) those under age twelve. The proscriptions and
restrictions on work decrease as the child reaches each successive stage, so
that only work deemed "particularly hazardous" is precluded for the child
aged sixteen or over.
At first glance, the FLSA's classification of all people under age eighteen
as "children" appears more restrictive than the JArbSchG with regard to those
protected. The law appears to apply to all through age seventeen, whereas
the JArbSchG provides greater protection for Kinder than for Jugendliche.
However, the FLSA's later subdivision that prohibits certain activities
89. Id. § 5, 1. See infra notes 101-13 and accompanying text for discussion of work
prohibited and exceptions.
90. Id. §§ 7-46. See infra notes 114-53 and accompanying text for discussion of work
prohibited and exceptions.
91. Id. § 2, 3.
92. JOHANNES ZMARLIK, JUGENDARBEITsSCHUTZ KOMMENTAR 53 (3d ed. 1985).
93. Id.

94.
1992).

95.
143-53
96.
97.
98.

MICHAEL SCHODEN, JUGENDARBEITSSCHUTZGESETZ, BASISKOMMENTAR

48 (3d ed.

JArbSchG § 9, 4. The Berufsschule statutory coverage is explained at infra notes
and accompanying text.
FLSA §§ 201-219.
Id. § 203(1).
Id. § 213(c)(1) & (2).
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according to age groups in reality accomplishes this same distinction.
Because both laws apply to persons under age eighteen, and both increase the
scope of proscribed work activity according to decreasing age scales, the
concept of those protected under the two statutes is essentially indistinguishable.
C. ProhibitedWork, Exemptions and Exceptions
1. JArbSchG
Prior to making any distinction between Kinder and Jugendliche, the
JArbSchG expressly exempts from the Act all insignificant or occasional
tasks, such as those performed because of courtesy, or activities attendant to
the usual chores in the home or in institutions such as orphanages and homes
for the handicapped.99 One legal scholar has noted that these exemptions
are so confined and narrow that they have little, if any, applicability with
respect to businesses and the actual workplace.'"
a. Provisions applicable to Kinder
The general rule is that all employment is prohibited for those under age
fourteen.1"' Excepted from this prohibition are activities of children aged
thirteen who are: (a) working up to three hours per day on a farm with a
parent or guardian;0 2 (b) working up to three hours per day attending crops
with a parent or guardian's consent; (c) working up to three hours per day
delivering newspapers or magazines with such consent; or (d) working up to
two hours per day assisting with sports equipment with such consent. 103
The provisos attached to this exception are that the activities be nonstrenuous
and suitable for the young (geeignet), and that they not take place between
6 p.m. and 8 a.m., nor before or during school hours."° The statute does
permit a person who is fifteen years of age, yet whose remaining school
obligations classify him as a Kind, to work during the school year, but for no
more than four weeks during a calendar year.0
Upon application to the appropriate governmental authority, certain

99. JArbScbG § 1, 2.
100. BRAUSER & SCHODEN, supra note 20, at 62.
101. JArbSchG § 5,
1. The JArbSchG is enforced by inspection officers
(Aufsichtsbehorde)who are officials of the Lnder. See infra notes 206-42 and accompanying
text on enforcement provisions.
102. JArbSchG § 5, 3, sent. 1.
103. Id. § 5, 3, sent. 2.

104. Id.
105. Id. § 5, 4. Even those age 14 or older are considered Kinder if they have not yet
completed their obligatory school attendance. Id. § 2, 3.
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activities in the entertainment field may also garner exceptions so that
children might engage in them. The statute specifies a sliding scale of the
maximum hours and the times the child might perform when granted an
exception. For theatrical performances, children ages six and older may work
up to four hours daily between the hours of 10 a.m. and 11 p.m. 10 6 With
regard to musical, radio, and television performances, children ages six and
older may perform up to three hours per day between 8 a.m. and 10 p.m.,
and children ages three through five may perform up to two hours per day
between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m.10 7 Expressly excluded from permissible
performances are those that take place in cabarets, dance halls, amusement
parks, fairs, and other such establishments.108
To obtain an entertainment exception, the parent or guardian must apply
in writing, indicating his or her consent. The local youth office (Jugendamt)
then conducts a hearing. 1' 9 The Aufsichtsbehorde (inspection officers) then
might grant permission, provided the applicant provides a physician's report
that the child has been examined within the last three months, thus assuring
that the child is healthy and that the activities pose no danger to him."0
Before the permit is granted, the Aufsichtsbehorde also must be convinced
that the child will be assured an uninterrupted fourteen-hour break between
performances, and that there will be no interference with the child's
schooling."' The officer determines the allowable hours and length of
work, which are indicated on the exception." 2 The hearing officer then
presents the authorization to the employer, who cannot legally allow the child
to perform until obtaining this written permission from the
Aufsichtbeh6rde.113
b. Jugendliche
Although the definition of a Jugendlicher is a person age fourteen and
older, the law extends the general prohibition against working through age
fifteen.'
The exception to this rule is the Jugendlicher who is not yet
fifteen, but who has already completed his obligatory schooling. The youth
is permitted to work either for one who is teaching him a trade
(Berufsausbildungsverhdltnis, i.e., "relationship establishing vocational
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
14.

Id. § 6,
Id.§ 6,
Id.§ 6,
Id.§ 6,
Id. § 6,
Id. § 6,
Id.§6,
Id.§6,
Id. § 7,

1, sent. 1.
1, sent. 2.
1.
2, sent. 1.
2, sent. 2.
2, sents. 5-6.
3.
4.
1. A simpler wording would have defined "Kinder" as those through age
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training"), or in non-vocational training work that is not strenuous and is
limited to seven hours per day and thirty-five hours per week." 5
The general rule for those age fifteen, but not yet sixteen, and who have
no remaining school obligations is that they might work, subject to
exhaustive limitations. There are three major types of restrictions on
employment for Jugendliche ages fifteen and older. First, the law prohibits
several types of work. Second, when work is permitted, there are strict
regulations with respect to the hours and days Jugendliche might work.
Finally, the law was carefully drafted so as to avoid any conflict with
schooling.
(1) Prohibited work for Jugendliche
The law forbids work considered dangerous (gefdhrlich) and broadly
designates the characteristics of such activities. Dangerous work (and thus
forbidden for Jugendliche) includes work that is beyond their
capabilities;" 6 work that poses a moral (sittlich) danger;" 7 activities
associated with frequent accidents, and which might be more likely by one
whose young age makes him less aware; work involving excessive heat, cold,
or dampness; or work posing dangers because of noise, tremors, dangerous
radiants, or poisonous substances."'
The restriction does not apply to
those age sixteen or over when the dangerous exposure is necessary to train
the worker for a particular occupation, provided a responsible and expert
adult supervises him or her." 9
The law also forbids piece work where the rate of pay is governed
according to speed or quantity of production. In fact, children usually may

115. Id.§7,

2.

116. Id. § 22, 1, sent. 1. One labor law commentator has given the following suggestions
for limits as to what a Jugendlichermight be required to lift: for female Jugendliche, no tasks
should require carrying more than 15 kilograms for more than four steps; for male
Jugendliche,no more than 35 kilograms for more than four steps. For jobs requiring carrying
objects further than four steps, these weight limits are, 10 kilograms and 20 kilograms,
respectively. ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 305.
117. JArbSchG § 22, 1, sent. 2. The concept of what poses a moral danger to a
Jugendlicher is presumably an objective one. Examples of what constitutes moral danger
include exposing him to written materials, pictures, films, or videos which display or contain
pornography, crudeness, violence, crime, and racial hatred. ZMARLIK, supra note 90, at 305.
Further, some types of work simply by their very nature are "ungeeignet," such as work by
female Jugendliche as nude dancers or barmaids. Id. at 306. The apparent problem with such
a proviso in the U.S. would be the Equal Protection difficulty of prohibiting some work for
females, but not for males.
118. JArbSchG § 22, 1.
119. Id. § 22,
2. The procedure for obtaining the exception is through the
Aufsichtsbeh6rde, similar to the exceptions from provisions applicable to Kinder in § 6. See
id. § 14, IM6-7.
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not even work in an area where adult co-workers perform piece work. 2 °
An exception allows children to work in an area with adults performing piece
work only if it is necessary to train the Jugendlicher for his trade or if he has
completed his training. This exception, too, requires the supervision of a
Yet the exception still does not
competent adult who is an expert.'
in piece work himself.
to
engage
permit the Jugendlicheractually
In addition, Jugendliche are not permitted to work underground." 2
Those at least sixteen years of age might be excepted from this prohibition
if necessary for training for a trade or if he has already completed training.
Again, the Jugendliche must be supervised by a competent adult expert. 23
The final section that lists work forbidden for Jugendliche has no parallel
section in the FLSA. The provision disallows work performed for designated
persons and thus makes certain categories of individuals ineligible to employ
or supervise Jugendliche. There are five such groups, and all require that the
person has been convicted of certain crimes. 124 Ineligible to serve as an
employer is any person convicted of: (1) a crime resulting in imprisonment
for two years or more; or (2) an intentional act violating his duties as
employer or vocational instructor of Kinder or Jugendliche, and who has
been imprisoned for at least three months because of such conviction; or (3)
a crime involving conduct with youth in the military service, activity
educating one under age sixteen, or sexual crimes; or (4) a crime involving
illegal drugs; or (5) at least two crimes involving dissemination of literary
work forbidden for distribution to minors.' 25
It is significant that this ineligibility-as-employer section applies not only
to employers who themselves have been previously convicted, but also to
employers of supervisory personnel who have been so convicted. 126 The
ineligibility continues for five years after the person's release from prison, or
five years from the date of the judgment, whichever occurs later.'27
Categories (1) and (2) do not disqualify parents or guardians as employers,
only third party non-custodians of the Jugendliche to be employed. 2 Last,

120. Id. § 23,

1.

121. Id. § 23, 2. The same procedure through the Aufsichtsbeh6rde must be followed. Id.
§ 14, IM6-7.
122. Id. § 24, 1.
123. Id. § 24, 2. Again, the procedure is by application to the Aufsichtsbeh6rde
according to § 14, I 6-7. See id. § 14, 6-7.
124. Id. § 25.
125. The final three subsections also apply to those who were fined rather than imprisoned.
ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 333. Group (b) also refers to those guilty of harming a
Jugendlicherin their capacity as employer or supervisor. Groups (c) and (d), however, refer
to persons who have harmed a Jugendlicher in any setting. Id.
126. Id. at 331.
127. Id. at 335.

128. Id. at 337. There is no apparent reason for this exception to the disqualification.
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the statute empowers the Federal Minister of Employment and Social Policy
(Bundesministerfitr Arbeit und Sozialordnung, hereinafter BA) to adopt
further regulations indicating those additional occupations which pose dangers
for Jugendliche, and those occupations which are in fact suitable for
Jugendliche under age fifteen. Upon approval by the Bundesrat, such
regulations are to have the force of law.'29
(2) Restrictions regarding hours and days worked
The second area addressing prohibitions on Jugendliche work does not
actually prohibit work, but rather places limitations on permissible work.
The general rule is that Jugendliche might work a maximum of eight hours
per day and forty hours per week. 30 Longer hours are permitted on farms
during harvest season for Jugendliche sixteen or seventeen years of age.'
The Jugendlicher may work only between 6 a.m. and 8 p.m., 32 with
exceptions for sixteen-year-olds at certain establishments. For example, work
may commence in bakeries as early as 5 a.m., and may continue in late night
3
establishments until 11 p.m., subject to the maximum hour restriction.1 1
Saturday workM and Sunday work 135 are permitted only in places such
as hospitals, open markets, barber and beauty shops, physicians' emergency
services, and vehicle repair shops. Generally, Jugendlicherare not permitted
to work on designated legal holidays. 136 Designated rest periods are
prescribed: thirty-minute breaks are required for work periods of four-andone-half to six hours, and sixty-minute breaks for periods in excess of six
hours. 37 The spacing of pauses also is regulated so that the first may not
begin prior to one hour after the work day has begun, and the last may not
begin later than one hour before the work day is to end.138
Minimum annual vacation times are assured according to age: those
under age sixteen at the beginning of the calendar year must have thirty work
days vacation; those under age seventeen, twenty-seven days; and those under
age eighteen, twenty-five days. Children working in mines must be granted
129. JArbSchG § 26. The BA's authority further to proscribe activities for Jugendlichehas
been a part of German law since 1875. The provision allowing him also to establish what
work is permissible was an addition to the 1976 law. ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 338.
130. JArbSchG § 8. This same section permits up to 8 1/2 hours work per day, provided
the work week does not exceed 40 hours. Id.
131. Id. § 8, 3.
132. Id. § 14, 1. The 1976 law had restricted the hours from 7 a.m.-8 p.m. but the 1984
amendment extended the day to 6 a.m. SCHODEN, supra note 94, at 108.
133. JArbSchG § 14, 2, sents. 2, 4.
134. Id. § 16.
135. Id. § 17.
136. These days are December 24, January 1, the Easter holiday, and May 1. Id. § 18.
137. Id. § 11, 1.
138. Id. § 11, 2.
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three additional days.139 This provision should be compared with the
eighteen working days vacation time that German law mandates for adult
workers.' 4° Exceptions to these prescribed hours of work might be
application
permitted upon application to the Aufsichtsbeh6rde, similar to1 the
41
performances.
entertainment
Kinder
for exceptions to permit
(3) Limitations on work imposed by the Jugendlicher's school attendance
The German statute includes detailed sections applicable to the
Jugendlicher who attends a Berufsschule. Except for the reference in the
U.S. Department of Labor Regulations to Work Experience and Career
Exploration Programs,142 the U.S. statute has no comparable provision.
This elaborate statutory attention to vocational training under German law
merits an explanatory comment.
Among those areas to which Germany's federal legislature has given full
deference to the Lander is education. 143 The Ldnder are empowered to
determine the number of hours of school required, which days are to be
school days, and which schools are official Berufsschule (vocational training
schools).'" The federal government officially recognized this Lander
4
power in the Hamburg Agreement (Hamburger Ankommen) of 1964. 1
Accordingly, the various Ldnder differ both with regard to the minor's duty
to attend school full time (Vollzeitschule) and to his duty to attend school
part-time once he begins a Berufsschule course of study. These collective
school attendance obligations are referred to as Schulpflicht, or "school
duties."
Generally, full-time school duties begin at age six in a grammar school
(Grundschule). Most Linder continue Grundschule attendance for nine
years, except for Berlin and Nordhein-Westfalen, which extend the
Grundschule program to ten years. 46 After the completion of this nine- or
ten-year course of basic study, the student either continues schooling in a
Gymnasium, which prepares him for university study, or begins a part-time
school attendance obligation at a Berufsschule, where he learns a viable trade.
It is this latter student for whom the sections of the JArbSchG coordinating

139. Id. § 19, 2.
140. Bundesurlaubsgesetz (BUrlG), 1963 BGBI. I 2.
141. JArbSchG § 27, 3.
142. 29 C.F.R. § 570.35a (extending the permissible 18-hour work week for 14- and 15year-olds to 23 hours for those enrolled in approved WECEP programs).
143. MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 83, at 3.110.12, § 1.2(F).
144. ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 126.
145. § 2, 2 des Abkommens zwischen den Landern der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zur
Vereinheitlichung auf den Gebiet des Schulwesens (Hamburger Abkommen) vom 28 Okt.
1964.
146. ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 54.
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the part-time school duty with his Ausbildung (training work during his
vocation study) were adopted. The part-time school attendance obligation for
the Berufsschuler also varies somewhat according to the law of the particular
Land, but generally it continues until the end of the school year in which he
has reached the age of eighteen. 47 In some Linder, for example Bayern
and Hesse, the requirement is simply three years. 48
Most Berufsschuler have at least six hours of formal instruction per
week, supplemented with training work for an employer in a vocational
training work relationship (Ausbildungsverhidltinis). The 1960 JArbSchG
prohibited work by a Jugendlicher who is attending a Berufsschule on any
school day with more than six hours of instruction. 149 The 1976 law is
coordinated
with the Law Regulating Vocational
Training
(Berufsbildungsgesetz)150 so that the work and school hours are
complementary, and the policies of both statutes are implemented. Generally,
the Jugendlichermay not work on any instructional school day which begins
before 9 a.m., or for more than two hours in any school week with more than
a twenty-five-hour instruction block, i.e., a week on which schooling takes
place on at least five days.'
The employer is required to release the
Jugendlicher for tests and school exercises. 52 Yet the employer is not
under a duty to free the Jugendlicher from work on a day when there is no
formal school instruction, or when the youth is out of school because of
illness.'53
These seemingly complicated employer duties are necessary in order to
comport with the Jugendlicher's Berufsschule obligations, the latter being
imposed by laws of the Ldnder. Thus,, they necessitate the employer's
balancing the general rules that the JArbSchG imposes on hours and days of
work with the supplementary execution of the principles embodied by the
German Ausbildung program. The legislative design was twofold: (1) to
ensure the Jugendlicher's completion of both the scholastic and practical
components of his vocational training; and (2) to align these educational

147. Id. at 126-27.
148. Id.
149. JArbSchG § 13 (1960) (amended 1976).
150. Berufsbildungsgesetz § 7 [BBiG], 1979 BGBI. I 1112.
151. JArbSchG § 9, 1.
152. Id. § 10.
153. There is no rational explanation as to why he might be physically able to work, but
not to attend school.
An interesting related situation is the status of the employer's duty if the Jugendlicheris
simply playing hookey (the Germans use the verb schwanizen). There is a split of opinion
regarding whether the employer must send such a Jugendlicherhome. BRAUSER & SCHODEN,
supra note 20, at 128; § 9 Anm. 2 (yes); Molitor, supra note 53;. § 9 Anm. 8 (no).
Nonetheless, the employer does have cause to terminate a Berufsschuler who engages in
repeated schwinzen. See ZMARKLIK, supra note 92, at 128.
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commitments with the employer's duty to comply with the maximum-hour
restrictions in the JArbSchG.
2.

FLSA

The same congressional intent underlying the minimum wage and
overtime sections of the law also influenced the portion on working minors.
Indeed, the primary focus of the legislature was on the wage and hour
provisions, rather than on those addressing child labor. The courts have
viewed the purpose of the sections regulating child labor as both economical
and sociological: to protect adult employees against compensation of minors,
The FLSA provias well as to protect children against harmful labor."
sions addressing child labor, then, do not comprise the greater portion of the
Act. With regard both to the quantity of the original statutory treatment 55
and to the subsequent amendments 15 6 the major thrust of the law has been
its attention to wages and hours.
The depth of statutory treatment of child labor in the FLSA relative to
that in the JArbSchG is perhaps deceptive, however, because Congress
responded to the same concerns as did the Bundestag and addressed most of
the same major areas. Two factors are relevant in the comparative lengths
of the two laws. First, Congress elected to include child labor coverage
within comprehensive legislation wherein the main focus was upon wages
and hours, rather than to disjoin those provisions into an independent and
separate bill. Second, statutes in civil law countries such as Germany are
customarily more copious than those in common law countries such as the
United States, where the role of the courts in interpreting statutory language
is a more significant one.
These two considerations should be kept in mind before concluding that
the relative brevity of the U.S. law infers that Congress viewed the issue of
child labor less seriously than did the Bundestag. The activities prohibited
for protected persons, the exemptions, and the restrictions on work permitted
under the more detailed German law all have comparable provisions under
the FLSA or its supplementary regulations.

154. See, e.g., Lenroot v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 55 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.D. Mo. 1944),
affld in part and rev 'd in part on other grounds, 146 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1945).
155. FLSA §§ 206-207 (minimum wage and overtime obligations), § 203(m) (defines
"wage"), and the subsections in § 213, (exemptions from §§ 206, 207 and 203(m)), comprise
more than 27 columns in the U.S. Department of Labor's copy of the statute. Section 203(1),
defining "oppressive child labor," and § 212, prohibiting oppressive child labor, make up
fewer than three full columns.
156. Indeed, all significant amendments have substantively affected only wages and hours,
rather than child labor. See, e.g., Legislative History, Fair Labor Standards Amendment of
1974, Pub. L. 93-259, March 28, 1974, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811-2868 (Congress
did not make a single reference to child labor).
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The FLSA exempts three types of employment from the child labor
mandates: (1) work as an actor or performer in motion pictures, theatrical
productions, radio or television; 57 (2) delivery of newspapers to a consumer; 58 and (3) work for a homemaker in the making of wreaths from natural
elements.'5 9 As in the JArbSchG, the general rule under the FLSA is that
all work "particularly hazardous" is prohibited for all persons under age
eighteen. The FLSA scheme utilized is somewhat different, however,
16
because the FLSA simply outlaws the use of "oppressive child labor,"'
defined as any occupation so designated by regulations adopted by the
Secretary of Labor.' 6 ' Thus, the listing of proscribed jobs is not in the
statute itself, but rather in the accompanying regulations. The current
Department of Labor list of non-agricultural hazardous occupations prohibited
for all under age eighteen has remained essentially unchanged since the first
such list was drafted in 1975.162 The "hazardous occupations" list includes
the following seventeen industries or occupations:
1. manufacturing and storing explosives;
2. motor-vehicle driving and outside helper;
3. coal mining;
4. logging and sawmilling;
5. power-driven woodworking machines;
6. exposure to radioactive substances;
7. power-driven hoisting apparatus;
8. power-driven metal-forming, punching, and shearing machines;
9. mining, other than coal mining;
10. slaughtering, or meat-packing, processing, or rendering;
11. power-driven bakery machines;
12. power-driven paper-products machines;
13. manufacturing brick, tile, and kindred products;
14. power-driven circular saws, band saws, and guillotine shears;
15. wrecking, demolition, and ship-breaking operations;
16. roofing operations; and

157.
158.
159.
160.

FLSA § 213(c)(3).
Id. § 213(d).
Id.
Id. § 212(c).

161. Id. § 203(1).

162. See listing of regulations as of 1975. Note, supra note 57, at 590 (observing that there
had then been no changes in the list for the preceding 10 years, and that the 1975 regulations
are identical to the ones currently in effect).
There are no specified criteria for determining which occupations are hazardous and no
procedure for review of earlier designations. This is indicative of the degree of discretion
vested in the Secretary of Labor and the feasibility for significant change in what is termed
"particularly hazardous" with each new administration. Id.
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17. excavation operations. 63
This prohibition against engaging in hazardous work includes any employment by the child's parent or custodian as employer."6
The Secretary has ruled that, if participating in an apprentice or student
learning program, a sixteen- and seventeen-year-old may be permitted to
work in one or more of these seventeen occupations.
In order to be
permitted to perform such work in either program, the work must be
intermittent and for short durations, closely supervised, and incidental to
training for the minor's chosen craft or trade. The minor working in an
apprentice program must be registered with the Department of Labor.
Student learners are those most closely akin to the German Berufsschuler.
The vocational program in which he is participating must be recognized by
the governing educational authority (i.e., the state). Moreover, the student
must be a signatory to a written agreement incorporating the conditions that
supervision be required and that he be given on-the-job safety instruc65
tions.
In addition to the Secretary's list of "particularly hazardous occupations,"
the statute defines "oppressive child labor" as all work by those under age
sixteen other than for a parent or guardian."6 This section empowers the
Secretary to designate permissible work for those ages fourteen and fifteen,
however, provided it does not "interfere with their health and well-being" or
interfere with their schooling.' 67
Pursuant to this grant of power, the Department of Labor has extended
permissible work for minors aged fourteen and fifteen to non-agricultural
designated occupations. Included are some nine specified tasks in retail, food
service, and gasoline service establishments. 68 As under German law,
permitted work is restricted to accommodate the child's school obligations.
Except for Work Experience and Career Exploration Programs
(WECEP),'" the minor may work no more than three hours per day nor

163. 29 C.F.R. § 570(E).
164. Id.
165. Child Labor Requirements in Nonagricultural Occupations under the FLSA, WH-! 330,
rev. Aug. 1990.
166. FLSA § 203(1).
167. Id.
168. These include such activities as working in office, clerical or cashier capacities;
bagging, carrying out customers' orders; delivering and performing errand work by foot,
bicycle or public transportations; engaging in cleanup and maintenance (provided no power
driven mowers or cutters are used); working in kitchens using specified machinery only;
engaging in designated work with cars and trucks; and cleaning vegetables and fruits,
wrapping, sealing, labeling, weighing, pricing and stocking goods, provided work is physically
separate from freezers and cookers and areas where meat is prepared.
169. 29 C.F.R. § 570(E).
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more than eighteen hours per week during school time. When school is not
in session, these hours are a maximum of eight hours per day and forty hours
per week. Thus, "overtime" in the sense of the FLSA is not permitted for
the fourteen- or fifteen-year-old. 170 Such minors are further restricted as
to the hours during which they might work, because the regulations permit
no work during school hours (except for WECEP programs) and no work
prior to 1717 a.m. nor after 7 p.m. (9 p.m. during summer non-school
months).
Like the JArbSchG, the FLSA gives special treatment to agricultural
labor. The statute exempts fourteen- or fifteen-year-olds from the child labor
restrictions for agricultural work outside school hours. 72 The FLSA also
allows twelve- or thirteen-year-olds to work outside school hours in
agricultural work, provided either they have the consent of a parent or
guardian or a parent or guardian is an employee on the same farm.
Finally, the child eleven-years-old or younger might work outside school
hours in agricultural
work, but only if he is employed by his parent or
74
guardian.1
An analysis of U.S. and German law reveals the following similarities
between the U.S and German child labor statutes: (1) both exempt (or
provide for exceptions upon application to the appropriate governing official,
in the case of the JArbSchG) actors, television, radio, and musical performers; (2) both exempt (or provide for application for exception) newspaper
delivering; (3) both permit minors of all ages to perform at least some work
for parents; (4) both meticulously assure that any work by minors with
school obligations does not interfere with these obligations; (5) both separate
non-agricultural and agricultural work, providing particular latitude for the
latter; (6) both impose major restrictions on minors for ages fourteen and
lower and increase limitations on permitted work as the minor's age
decreases; (7) both restrict hours worked for at least some of the protected
groups; (8) both prohibit work deemed hazardous or dangerous for the minor
worker; and (9) both empower federal authorities to enlarge or decrease the'
scope of activities prohibited for protected persons.
The JArbSchG contains extensive miscellaneous regulations regarding
required breaks and paid vacations that have no corollary in the FLSA's child
labor provisions. The Bundestag enacted these sections as necessary

170. FLSA § 207 designates overtime as that in excess of 40 hours per week.
171. 29 C.F.R. § 570(E).
172. FLSA § 213(c)(1)(C).
173. Id. § 213(c)(l)(B)(i) and (ii).
174. Id. § 213(c)(I)(A). Alternatively, he might engage in agricultural work during nonschool hours with parental consent if the farm is one where the employer is not required by
law to pay his workers the federal minimum wage. Id. § 213(c)(l)(A)(ii).
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complements to other German statutes that provide explicitly for the adult
worker in these areas. These sections in the JArbSchG are invariably more
favorable for the Jugendlicher in the workplace than for his or her adult
counterpart,' 75 affirming the
general German concept that minors be
76
afforded special treatment.
The underlying rationale for the hourly restrictions contained in the
JArbSchG also are concordant with the Ausbildungs training, for the
Berufsschuler. The FLSA, on the other hand, addresses the fourteen- to
fifteen-year-old who is a student in a typical U.S. secondary school, which
is not a facsimile of the German Berufsschule. The FLSA thus precludes the
child's working during school hours (with the exception of the WECEP
participant). German law also requires that the Berufsschuler not work
during instructional time. These hours in school are abbreviated when
compared with the U.S. student's school day because of the German practice
of coordinating the theoretical with the practical aspects of education.
Because both systems stringently prohibit interference with the child's
schooling, any differences therefore simply respond to the variations in the
school systems.
The most striking differences in the substantive prohibitions and
exemptions are two additions to the German statute that have no U.S.
counterparts. The first is the inclusion within the concept of prohibited
"hazardous" work of any occupation or work environment that might be
morally damaging to the minor. The Department of Labor's list of
"hazardous occupations" includes only those posing physical dangers.
Second, the JArbSchG lists specific crimes, making persons convicted of
such crimes ineligible to serve as employers of minors. Both sections
apparently indicate the Bundestag's effort to shield the young worker from
deleterious influences as well as from personal harm. On the contrary,
Congress simply attempted to limit the minor worker's exposure to
surroundings potentially injurious to his bodily development and detrimental
to his educational training. The resulting U.S. statute, then, was responsive
only to this concern. Congress was neither lobbied, nor is there evidence of
any intent or purpose on its part, to curb immoral influences on the young
worker in the marketplace.

175. Compare the requirement that a break be given to Jugendlicheemployees at the end
of 4 1/2 hours of work with the requirement that a break be given the male worker at the end
of six hours. AZO § 12, 2. Interestingly, the Jugendlicher is treated in this respect the
same as the female worker in Germany, who is also entitled to a break after 4 1/2 hours work.

AZO § 11. See also supra note 11.
176. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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D. Penaltiesfor Violations and Enforcement Provisions
1. JArbSchG
a. Penalties:
Two sections in the German statute govern penalties for noncompliance.
The severity of the infraction determines which of the section applies. The
more serious violations are listed in Section 58, and either a civil or a
criminal penalty can be imposed for these acts. The lesser violations are
addressed in Section 59, and are punishable only with civil penalties.
(i) Section 58
This section contains a catalogue of some twenty-nine possible acts of
noncompliance.'
The Bundestag deemed all the acts substantively
necessary to carrying out the purpose of the law. These provisions relate
directly to the federal government's178commitment to prevent harm to the
development of the younger worker.
The 1976 statute designated more acts as punishable by the imposition
of civil penalties than had its 1960 predecessor. The Bundestag's intent was
to assure closer compliance with the Act by broadening the discretionary
powers of the Aufsichtsbeh6rde, which is empowered to assess these civil
penalties.'79 The Bundestag also increased the possible penalty for serious
civil violations as listed in Section 58 from DM 5000 to DM 20,000.180
Whether punishable by civil or criminal penalties under Section 58,
violations are the same list of proscribed acts. The determining factor
governing whether the noncompliance merits criminal punishment is whether
the defendant had in fact endangered the safety or health of a person
protected under the statute.'
The law does not require that the danger be
a life-threatening, or even a serious, hazard. Rather, it simply must have
posed a direct peril either to the Jugendlicher's or Kind's health or to his
capacity to engage in gainful employment. 8 2
The criminal violations are also in two gradations: (1) intentional or
83
repeated violations, punishable by fine or up to one year imprisonment;'
and (2) negligent violations, punishable by fine or up to six months imprison-

177. JArbSchG § 58, 1.
178. BRAUSER & SCHODEN, supra note 20, at 259.
179. ZMARLK, supra note 92, at 488; see also infra note 218.
180. See 1960 JArbSchG §§ 66-68; 1976 JArbSchG § 58, 4.
181. JArbSchG § 58,
5-6.
182. See MOLITOR, supra note 53, at 524.

183. JArbSchG § 58,

5.
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ment.' s Unlike most U.S. federal or state laws, German penal statutes
assess either a fine or confinement, but not both. 5 To arrive at the
amount of a fine, German law utilizes a two-step daily rate (Tagessatze)
process modeled after the systems used in Finland, Denmark, and Sweden. 8 6 The first phase determines how many "days" the violator should
be ordered to pay. This decision depends entirely on the gravity of the crime
for which the violator was convicted. The criminal law sets a general
minimum of five and maximum of 360 days which might be imposed, unless
a statute indicates otherwise.' 87 The JArbSchG establishes the maximum
fine for violations as 180 Tagessatzen,l18 and the general minimum of five
days applies.
Phase two establishes an amount he must pay for each of these days.
This amount reflects the judge's consideration of the defendant's personal
income, his number of dependents, and his other resources' 89 The per
diem amount can vary from DM 2 to DM 10,000.'90
If a single act simultaneously violates a civil and a criminal law, only the
criminal punishment is applicable. 9 If the criminal provisions of the
JArbSchG apply, but a stricter criminal law has also been violated (e.g., an
injury had resulted to the Jugendlicherby reason of the noncompliance),
the
192
stricter criminal statute supercedes the more lenient one.
(ii) Section 59
The second section prescribes penalties for violation. It carries only civil
penalties, and these are for a maximum of DM 5000.19'

Under German

law, the minimum civil penalty is DM 5. 9 The violations include: (1)
failure to wait until obtaining permission from the Aufsichtbehorde before
employing a child in an excepted capacity, such as a theatrical performance;
(2) failure to provide a complete break from work duties during permitted
rest pauses; (3) failure to instruct a legally employed Jugendlicherin a timely

184. Id. at

6.

185. Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) § 12, 1981 BGBI. 1 1329, defines felony (Verbrechen) and
misdemeanor (Vergehen) according to the severity of punishment, as do most statutes in the
United States. The statutory wording, however, provides only for alternative, not cumulative,
methods of punishment.
186. 2 REINHARD MAURACH ET AL., STRAFRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEL 504, § 59 III para.
25 (7th ed. 1989).

187.. StGB § 40, 1.
188. JArbSchG § 58, 6.
189. This two-part process is established in StGB §§ 40-43, and explained in detail in
MAURACH, supra note 186, at 504, § 59, para. 26.
190. Id.
191. Gesetz uiber Ordnungswidrigkeiten [OWiG], 1968 BGBI. I 481.
192. StGB § 52.
193. JArbSchG § 59, 3.
194. MOLITOR, supra note 53, at 523.
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fashion regarding work hazards; (4) failure to make a timely reminder to the
Jugendlicher of the need to have a medical reexamination; (5) failure to
retain a doctor's report on the Jugendlicher; (6) failure to permit the
Jugendlichertime off for the medical examination; (7) failure to display in
a proper manner a copy of the JArbSchG, schedule of work hours and
breaks, list of Jugendliche employed, or copy of any exceptions the
Aufsichtsbehorde has granted for the employment of Jugendliche; and (8)
failure to allow Aufsichtsbehdrde to perform a workplace inspection. 95
Persons who commit an act that violates both this section of the JArbSchG
and another statute which also provides for civil penalties are assessed only
196
one penalty.
The severity of civil penalties for violations of the JArbSchG might be
contrasted with those imposed for violations of a comparable statute for the
adult worker. Although Germany has no minimum wage laws, there are
statutes providing for maximum work hours and for overtime pay in certain
instances. 7 Violations of these statutes carry maximum civil penalties of
only DM 1000,198 compared with the DM 5000 and DM 20,000 fines that
accompany violations of the JArbSchG's Sections 59 and 58, respectively.
If a single employer unlawfully employs more than one protected Kind or
Jugendlicher, however, German law views this as only one violation. This
principle affirms the social purpose of assuring a policy of work safeguards
for minors as a part of public law, rather than as statutory protection for the
9
individual Kind or Jugendlicher.'
With regard to who might violate the law, the scope of the concept of
"employer" under the JArbSchG is considerably broader than is usual in
other German statutes. 2' For example, an indirect employer, such as one
employing a Jugendlicher on hire from his actual employer, is responsible
for upholding the law. Also considered an "employer" is any agent of the
employer, such as a supervisor. In such a case, however, only one is liable.
The determinant is whether the true employer had actually delegated duties
to his agent in the latter case, or whether he had actually transferred control

195. JArbSchG § 59, 1. All these duties of the employer are discussed in more detail
under "Additional Safeguards Unique to the JArbSchG," infra note 281-314 and accompanying
text.
196. MOLITOR, supra note 53, at 524-25; see also supra notes 191-92 and accompanying
text for rules on the criminal law.
197. The general rule for the adult worker is a maximum of eight hours per day and 40
hours per week, with an additional two hours permitted for as many as 30 days per year. AZO
§ 3. For all such overtime work, "suitable" ("angemessene")extra pay is required, and the law
defines "angemessene" as no less than 25% the usual rate of pay. Id. § 6.
198. Criminal sanctions for violations, however, are the same as for those in the JArvSchG:
up to one year if intentional, and up to six months or 180 Tagessatzen if negligent. Id. § 25.
199. ZMARLUK, supra note 92, at 494-95.
200. GNTHER SCHAUB, ARBEITSRECHTS HANDBuCH 1051-52 (6th ed. 1987).
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of the Jugendlicher to the borrowing employer in the former case. If such
delegation or transfer took place, the second employer is chargeable with
upholding the provisions of the JArbSchG.20'
An employer's mistake regarding the meaning or content of the law is
not a defense.2 2 His error regarding the actual age of an unlawfully
employed Kind or Jugendlicher, however, might excuse him, provided the
employee in fact presented the employer with false identification. In such
case, the employer is not charged with the duty of verifying the person's
age.20 3 Similarly, persons cannot waive their right to protection under the
law. "° Nonetheless, the law provides no right of action for the protected
Kind or Jugendlicher to petition a court for damages, again reinforcing the
public law nature of the statute.20 5
b.

Enforcement

Enforcement is at the Land level 2°6 through Aufsichtsbeh6rde inspections. 217 These officials are authorized to conduct unannounced inspections
2 °s
of the site of any business employing at least one Kind or Jugendlicher,
and it is not necessary that the inspection take place when a Kind or
Jugenlicher employee is actually on the premises. 2°9 If the employer
presents proof that he has no such employee(s), the Aufsichtsbehdrde has no
corresponding authority to inspect for violations.2" °
Agents acting for the Aufsichtsbeh6rde in this inspection role may
include factory overseers, doctors, or any other experts the Aufsichtsbeh6rde
authorizes when special circumstances merit such deputization.2" The only
substantial limitation on these plenary powers to inspect occurs when the
worksite is a household, because the German Constitution (Grundgesetz)
assures the inviolability of the home. 2 Consequently, a home inspection
must be more than routine, and the Aufsichtsbehdrde must be able to prove
it is necessary to prevent urgent dangers. 3
The statute requires that a composite annual report of all inspections be
201. ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 489; see also infra notes 293-95 and accompanying text.
202. MOLrrOR, supra note 53, at 521.
203. Id. at 520. This is in contrast with the employer's duty to obtain an age certificate in
order to preclude liability for unintentional violations under FLSA regulations.
204. MOLITOR, supra note 53, at 520.
205. Id. at 522. U.S. law is quite different. See infra notes 257-70 and accompanying text.
206. JArbSchG § 51, 1.
207. Id. § 51, 2.
208. MOLITOR, supra note 53, at 474.
209. Id. at 473.
210. ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 442.
211. MOLITOR, supra note 53, at 268.
212. GG art. 13.
213. JArbSchG § 51, 2.
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made available to the public.2 14 This duty is not unique to the JArbSchG,
for all state inspection agents under general federal law must comply with
this regulation.1 5
If the inspection reveals a violation, the next step is for the
Aufsichtsbeh6rde to determine whether Section 58 or 59 applies. 216 If the
violation falls within the civil penalty provisions under either of these
sections, the Aufsichtsbeh6rde is empowered to determine the appropriate
amount.2 7 Appeal from that determination lies to the administrative court
of the Land.21 8
Regarding the amount of a civil penalty, the Aufsichtsbeh6rde effectuates
the civil principle of not punishing the violator, but rather of impressing upon
the business the importance of compliance. The penalty generally is gauged
by calculating the probable pecuniary gain that resulted from the unlawful
employment. Fines are then payable to the Land.21 9
Should the violation be criminally punishable, the Aufsichtsbeh6rde
advises the public attorney's office (Staatsanwalt),which begins the criminal
process.220 Further, if the Aufsichtsbeh6rde determines that the violation
is especially significant, that office must inform any other affected
governmental units,22' such as the authorities that enforce the statute
regulating vocational training. 222 This duty to report to external bodies
does not arise unless the offense is one which is, at the discretion of the
Aufsichtsbeh6rde, serious and substantial.2 23
The German statute also contains a provision which indirectly facilitates
the detection of unlawfully employed Kinder. The tax authorities are
required to advise the Aufsichtsbeh6rde of all income tax cards issued for
Kinder as defined under the JArbSchG (thus including Jugendliche with
remaining school obligations), regardless of the source of the income.224
One example of the usefulness of this section is the evidence revealed from
income tax cards for children in the city of Aachen in 1980. Of 157 tax
cards for children, 118 indicated income from employment. Only ninety-nine
of these 118 were legal, such as newspaper deliveries or performances
permitted through the exception procedure. The others included children
214. Id. § 51, 3.
215. Reichsgewerbeordnung(GewO) § 139b, 1 3, 1869 RGBI. 1900 871.
216. See supra notes 177-205 and accompanying text for discussion of penalties under
these two sections.
217. ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 488.
218. OWiG. §§ 65 ff.
219. ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 488.
220. MOLITOR, supra note 53, at 522-23.
221. JArbSchG § 53.
222. BBiG.
223. MOLITOR, supra note 53, at 484.
224. JArbSchG § 52.
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working for construction companies, hotels, factories, retail establishments,
and physicians.2 25
Other powers of the Aufsichtsbehdrde include granting exceptions where
the statute so provides.226 These requests for exceptions are granted on an
individual basis, 227 but the Aufsichtsbeharde's discretion is limited.
Because the officer cannot deny an exception on irrelevant grounds, the
process thus is often purely bureaucratic. 228 The exception must always
indicate an expiration date and is not valid without it. 229 The applicant
might be anyone who stands to benefit, including the Jugendlicher or his
legal representative, the parent of the Kind, the employer, or any combination
thereof.
There must be a formal application, however, and the
Aufsichtsbeh6rde has no authority to issue an exception on his own
volition.23 The officer might impose conditions which would result in
revocation in the event of noncompliance.2 3' If the exception is revoked,
the administrative procedure must first be exhausted,232 after which appeal
can be made to the administrative court (Verwaltungsgericht).23 3 Neither
the employer nor the Kind or Jugendlicherhas any private right to damages
by virtue of an allegedly wrongful refusal to grant, or a revocation of, an
exception.234
A final section of the law relating to enforcement requires the establishment of two advisory committees. The first is a State Committee for the
(Landesausschiij fir
of Minors
of Employment
Protection
2
5
(Landesregierung)
Land
government
Each
Jugendarbeitsschutz).
appoints a committee, which is to report directly to and to advise Land
administrative officials (Oberste Landbehbrde) on general procedures and
regulations under the JArbSchG. 236 The second required committee is one
formed at each local level. Known as the Committees for the Protection of
Working Minors (Ausschfle fur Jugendarbeitsschutz), they report to and

225. ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 448. All of these discovered violations were disciplined
through the JArbSchG.
226. See supra notes 101-13 and accompanying text on exceptions for Kinder under § 6,
and notes 121, 123 and 125, on exceptions for Jugendliche under §§ 14, 6-7; 27, 3; & 40,

3.

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

JArbSchG § 54, 2.
MOLITOR, supra note 53, at 489.
JArbSchG § 54, 1.
MOLITOR, supra note 53, at 351.
JArbSchG § 54, 1, sent. 3.
Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung [VwGO] §§ 68 ff., 1960 BGBI. 1 17.

233. Id. §§ 40, 42.
234. MOLITOR, supra note 53, at 495.

235. JArbSchG § 55.
236. Id. § 57,

1. See also MoLrroR, supra note 53, at 511-12 (providing a detailed

description of these Land committees).
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advise both the Oberste Landbehrrde and the Landesausschii3 flur
Jugendarbeitsschutz on all matters concerning direct administration and
execution of the law.237 The Landesausschzifl fur Jugendarbeitsschutz,
however, has no control over the local committees.2 38 Moreover, the local
committees are very useful because they have close contacts with factories
and workplaces employing minors.
Each Land and local committee is comprised of eighteen members,
including a physician and representatives from employee and employer
groups, Land or local government employment and youth offices, and a
vocational school (Berufsschule). All positions are honorary, and members
are only reimbursed for expenses incurred from the performance of official
duties. 239 The law does not establish a definite term of office, but a
member may resign or be removed for misfeasance or nonfeasance at any
time. 240 All members are charged with the general duty of confidentiality
required of all honorary governmental officials, 24' a duty which continues
even after they have completed their service in office.242
2.

FLSA

a. Penalties:
The sections providing for penalties for noncompliance with the mandates
of the FLSA 243 address all three subject matters2' and do not always
distinguish among them. Generally, the statute contains legal (including civil
penalties and monetary damages), equitable, and criminal sanctions. There
are, however, two striking differences between the penalties for violations of
the child labor sections as opposed to the minimum wage and maximum hour
provisions. First, the potential civil penalty for child labor is $10,000,245
but the maximum penalty for violations of minimum wage or maximum hour
provisions is only $1000. Second, an employee can recover monetary
damages from the employer only for minimum wage or overtime pay
violations, not for child labor noncompliances. Although the Act expressly

237. JArbSchG § 57,

4.

238. MOLITOR, supra note 53, at 508.

239. JArbSchG § 55, 4 & § 56, 3.
240. MOLITOR, supra note 53, at 503.
241. Verwaltungsverfahrengesetz [VwVfG] § 84, 1976 BGBI. 1 1253.
242. MOLITOR, supra note 53, at 503.
243. FLSA §§ 216-217 (1988).
244. The other two are the minimum wage directive (now $4.25 per hour), and the
requirement for one-and-one-half times the usual hourly rate of pay for work in excess of 40
hours per week. FLSA §§ 206-07.
245. Added to § 216(e) by § 9 FLSA Amendments of 1989, and amended by § 3103 of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.
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provides for actions at law for minimum wage and maximum hour
violations, 2" it is silent with regard to damages for child labor infractions.
Congress' failure to mention any express right to monetary damages in
child labor cases was the subject of litigation in Breitweiser v. KMS
Industries.247 In KMS, a sixteen-year-old was killed while operating a
high-lift forklift in violation of the regulation designating such activity as
particularly hazardous for minors.248 The decedent's parents filed both a
wrongful death action on diversity grounds,2 49 and a claim for monetary
damages under the FLSA. The plaintiffs' position was that, since each right
must have a remedy,250 and the FLSA provides for none in child labor
infractions, the courts should fashion a remedy for minors who are assigned
to dangerous work.25
The federal district court granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment on both counts. On appeal, a split Fifth Circuit Court held that
Congress' silence regarding civil damages for child labor violations was not
unintentional or an oversight, because it had expressly included this remedy
for infringements of the other two provisions. The court thus refused to
imply an additional remedy,2 2 viewing the statute's criminal sanctions as
substantial enough to deter violations and to accomplish the purpose of the
child labor prohibitions.253
The decision in KMS generated considerable scholarly comment, 2' but
Congress has not amended the statute so as to change the rule of law. Thus,
the potential civil penalties payable to the Department of Labor remain the
only civil sanctions for child labor violations. The maximum amount payable
by businesses that do not comply with the child labor provisions, however,
246. The statute allows the employee claiming underpayment under these provisions to file
suit in a state or federal court for himself, or for himself and others in a class action, requesting payment of the unpaid amount due and reasonable attorney's fees. FLSA § 216(b)
(1988). An additional equal amount is payable as liquidated damages unless the employer can
meet the burden of showing that his failure to comply was in good faith. Id. §§ 216, 211.
The Act also empowers the Secretary of Labor to petition a federal district court for injunctive
relief for violations of all three areas, including a prayer for damages in minimum wage and
maximum hour cases. Id. § 217. Should the noncompliance have been in either of these two
areas, any private action will then merge into the Secretary's action. Id. § 216(b).
247. 467 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 969 (1973).
248. Order No. 7, 29 C.F.R. § 422.7.
249. The trial court had dismissed the suit, holding that the workers compensation statute
was the exclusive remedy. The plaintiffs' contention was that the $750 maximum under that
law was inadequate and therefore not enforceable. Without further comment, the federal
appellate court upheld the trial court's decision that the claim had no merit. Breitweiser, 467
F.2d at 1392.
250. Id. at 1392 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1393.
253. Id.
254. See, e.g., Note, 10 Hous. L. REv. 512 (1973).
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far exceeds the potential civil penalties for the other two subject matters.255
The same criminal penalty provision applies to violations of all three
subject areas of the FLSA. A first-time violator is subject to a fine up to
$10,000. Upon a second conviction, the penalty increases to the possibility
of a fine as well as up to six months imprisonment.256
Violations are detected through an inspection process similar to that used
in Germany. The Act empowers the Secretary of Labor through his agents
to enter a covered business and to inspect the workplace and the employer's
records,257 to question employees, and to investigate "whatever facts,
conditions, or matters as he may deem necessary or appropriate"25 to
determine whether a violation has occurred.
If a child labor provision has been violated, the statute mandates that the
Secretary, subject to the direction and control of the Attorney General,
petition for an injunction.259 Congress clearly intended that the statutes
regulating employment of minors be strictly followed. Congress singled out
child labor violations as requiring the Secretary to seek injunctive relief,
rather than making it optional as in minimum wage and maximum hour
cases. The courts concur with this conclusion. For example, in Schulz v.
Salinas,260 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
denial of an injunction against a supplier of agricultural labor that had
wrongly permitted workers under age sixteen to work during school hours.
Although recognizing that issuance of an injunction "lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court," 261 the court found that the only evidence that
.the activities would not recur were the employer's assurance and letters to
this effect he had written to his crew. There had been no proof whatsoever
that he had overseen his workers to insure that they, followed his instructions,
inspected his farms, or checked with families of children employed to
determine whether they were in fact working during school hours. Therefore,
the court held the injunction to be both appropriate and required by the
2
Act.

26

The statute empowers the Secretary of Labor or the inspecting agent to
determine an appropriate civil penalty for violations. 263 In determining the

255. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. Compare this with German law, supra
notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
256. FLSA § 216(a).
257. See infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text (referring to the record-keeping
requirements).
258. FLSA § 211(a).
259. Id. § 212(b).
260. 416 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1969).
261. Id. at 414.
262. Id.
263. FLSA § 216(e).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

35

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 1

[Vol. 8

amount of the penalty, the Act requires that the Secretary of Labor consider
two factors: (1) the appropriateness relative to the size of the business; and
(2) the gravity of the violation. 2' The business that is assessed the penalty
has fifteen days after receipt of notice to challenge the penalty265 and obtain
a hearing before an administrative law judge from the Wage and Hour
Division of the Department of Labor.266 That decision is final, 267 and the
Act empowers the Secretary to recover the amount payable in federal
court. 268 The Labor Department has strictly enforced the child labor
provisions in particular, and penalties reflect this policy.
Illustrating the inexorable stance of the administration in child labor
violations is Marshall v. General Motors Corp.269 In General Motors, an
administrative law judge affirmed the inspector's assessment of the thenmaximum $1000 fine against the company, which unknowingly had
employed a minor as a punch operator, a job the Department of Labor
regulations designated as hazardous. The seventeen-year-old employee had
falsified her age on two separate occasions, both when she applied for
employment, and when she later requested payment of sickness and accident
benefits. The latter request emanated from an industrial accident that resulted
in the loss of part of her left arm.
The administrative law judge refused to lower the fine, despite the
defendant's record of no prior violations and the minor's twice deliberate
deception regarding her age. Although sympathizing with the employer's
situation and condemning the employee's prevarications, the administrative
court nonetheless viewed the resulting permanent disability as dispositive.
Yet the court also deemed significant the employer's failure to require the
minor to provide a certificate of age, the process a business must follow to
absolve itself from unintentional violations.270

264. Id. The Department of Labor regulations state that relative factors in determining these
criteria include, among other things, history of prior violations; evidence of willfulness or
failure to take reasonable precautions to avoid violations; number of minors unlawfully
employed; age of the minors so employed and records of the required proof of age; the
occupations in which the minors were so employed; exposure of such minors to hazards and
any resultant injury to them; the duration of illegal employment; hours of the day in which
it occurred, when appropriate; and whether such employment was during or outside school
hours. 29 C.F.R. § 579.5 (1975).
265. FLSA § 216(e)(3).
266. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1992); see also 29 C.F.R.
579.1(a)(3) (1975).
267. FLSA § 216(i)(3).
268. Id. § 216(e)(2).
269. 23 Wage & Hour Cases 1134 (Dep't. Labor 1976).
270. 29 C.F.R. § 570.36.
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b.

Enforcement

The Secretary of Labor's powers regarding the child labor provisions are
most significant when dealing with implementation. The Secretary has the
plenary power to issue regulations designating which occupations are
"particularly hazardous" and thus prohibited for all persons under age
eighteen. 27' The Act also empowers the Secretary to provide by order or
regulation which occupations (other than those in mining and manufacturing)
are not within the statutory concept of "oppressive child labor" for fourteenand fifteen-year-olds if there is no interference with the child's
schooling. 272 The Administrative Procedure Act273 governs all quasijudicial and rulemaking proceedings of federal administrative bodies. This
law requires that any regulation the Secretary of Labor adopts to be published
in the Federal Register at least thirty days prior to the effective date of the
rule," giving affected businesses sufficient time to file comments or
objections.
Similar to the JArbSchG, employers subject to the FLSA have certain
record-keeping requirements under the Act. The Department of Labor, which
monitors the record-keeping, issues regulations that supplement these
statutory requirements. The Act specifically authorizes the Secretary
of
Labor to issue regulations with respect to the detail and content of these
records.275 Current regulations thus require employers to maintain a record
of all employees under age eighteen by name, permanent (and, if applicable,
temporary) residence, and birthdate, with written parental consent in certain
circumstances.276
Employers of students in school-sponsored or -recognized vocational
programs must give the student on-the-job safety instructions and must
closely observe the conditions of the employment.277 Unlike German
employers who might avoid responsibility by delegating duties to supervisors
or to other employers by loaning out minor employees,278 courts in the
United States have held employers strictly liable for subordinates' acts
resulting in violations of FLSA child labor provisions. Illustrative of this

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

FLSA § 203(1).
Id.
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-553 (1946).
Id. § 553(d).
FLSA § 211 (c).
29 C.F.R. §§ 516, 545.

277. Child Labor Requirements in Nonagricultural Occupations under the FLSA, WH- 1330,
rev. 8/90. See supra note 165 and accompanying text regarding employment in accordance
with apprentice and WECEP programs.
278. See supra notes 200-21 and accompanying text regarding avoiding liability under the
JArbSchG when duties have been delegated.
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concept is the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in Lenroot v.
Interstate Bakeries Corp.27 9 In Lenroot, the court found that businesses are
to be strictly accountable for the common law violations of their employees,
and that this duty "does not end with mere directive communication
to ...subordinates. 280
E. Additional Safeguards Unique to the JArbSchG
The German statute has three significant components that are not a part
of the United States statutory scheme. First, the JArbSchG requires medical
examinations as a prerequisite to employing protected persons. Second, the
statute imposes various management posting duties. Finally, the JArbSchG
further seeks to protect minors from employer action beyond the scope of the
FLSA. This protective mentality justifies proscriptions against using corporal
punishment as a disciplinary measure or against giving alcohol or tobacco to
Jugendliche in the workplace.
1. Assuring the Minor Employee's Healthy Condition
(Gesundheitliche Betreuung)
Prior to engaging a Jugendlicherin the workplace, an employer must first
obtain from him a valid report from a physician who has examined the
prospective employee within the preceding fourteen months.28 1 The
purpose of the requirement is to detect any physical weaknesses early in the
minor's worklife so that the minor will not ultimately choose a line of work
that will harm him in the future.282 Categorized under public law as a
duty, the obligation to require the medical examination is that of the
employer. Consequently, it is impossible for the Jugendlicher himself to
violate this section. Any failure to comply with this duty does not absolve
the employer from other duties owed to the Jugendlicher individually, such

279. 146 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1945).
280. Id. at 328 (quoting People v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 121
N.E. 474, 476 which held that an employer "does not rid himself of that duty (to inquire into
the conditions prevailing in his business) because the extent of the business may preclude his
personal supervision and compel reliance on subordinates. He must then stand or fall with
those whom he selects to act for him.").
281. JArbSchG § 32,
1. The 14-month timeframe has been in effect since 1984, when
the legislature attempted to synchronize the sequence so that the examination takes place
before the vocational school year (Berufsschuljahr)begins. ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 372.
Prior to the 1976 law, a nine-month time was used. JArbSchG § 44. SCHAUB, supra note 200,

at 1061.
Neither the employer nor the Jugendlicherbears the cost of the examinations. The Land
pays. As a result, although the physician has a right to payment under public law, the regulations of the particular Land control the amount of the doctor's fee.
282. MOLITOR,supra note 53, at 373.
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as payment of
wages and provision of the social insurance required under
28 3
German law.

There are two exceptions to this requirement. First, no examination is
required for employment that is incidental or minor (geringftigig). One
commentator has characterized gerinfigig employment as constituting fifteen
work hours or less per week, in which the Jugendlicher is paid at most onesixth of the full-time rate.2u Second, the law dispenses with the requirement if the job is two months or less in duration and is not strenuous enough
to pose dangers to his health.28 5
Because the law speaks of a first examination (Ersteuntersuchung)of the
Jugendlicher when he enters his worldife (der in das Berufsleben eintritt), it
clearly requires only one such examination during the fourteen-month period.
A re-examination therefore is not necessary if the Jugendlicher changes
employers within that time.2" In the event of such change, however, the
second employer must have the report of the medical examination prior to the
Jugendlicher beginning work.287
A second physical examination (Erste Nachuntersuchung, or first reexamination) is required, and the employer is obligated to remind the
Jugendlicherof the need for this re-examination nine months after the minor
begins work. 28" Technically, the report of this examination is due at the
end of the minor's first year of work, and it must show that the re-examination occurred within the preceding three months.289
Should the
Jugendlicher not present the doctor's report to the employer when due, the
employer must then request it from him in writing, forwarding copies to the
290
works council (Betriebsrat), if any, and to the Aufsichtsbehdrde.
Without this second report, the Jugendlicher may not lawfully continue
employment after fourteen months from the date of the first examination.2 91
In addition to assuring that the Jugendlicher undergoes timely medical
examinations, the employer assumes other duties. The employer must retain
the doctor's report until the end of the Jugendlicher'semployment with him,
or until the Jugendlicherhas reached the age of eighteen, whichever occurs
first.292 The employer also must allow the young employee time off from

283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 377.
Id. at 381.
JArbSchG § 32,

2.

supra note 92, at 372.
287. JArbSchG § 36.
ZMARLIK,

288. Id. § 33,
289.' Id.

1.

290. Id. § 33,
291. Id. § 33,

2.

292. Id. § 41,

3.
1.
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work for any required medical examination without loss of pay.293
The Bundestag followed the recommendation of the European Economic
Community29 by including a provision in the law permitting, but not
requiring, another examination one year subsequent to the second one.295
As with the second examination, the employer is to give the Jugendlicher
timely notice of this right. However, the statutory language is that he
"should" (solo notify the Jugendlicher,making it not non-mandatory. There
are no sanctions in the statute, and no private rights of the Jugendlicher or
his parents, if the employer does not follow this legislative suggestion.2 9
As with the two required examinations, the government assumes the
physician's fee should the Jugendlicher again elect to be examined.297
The examining physician's duties are listed in the statute. In the report
of the first examination, he must document the health, stage of development,
2 98
and physical condition of the Jugendlicher.
Subsequent reports also
must address the effect of the work duties on these conditions. 2 9 The
attending physician must file a written report with the relevant government
3° on an official government
health care office (Personensorgeberechtigten)
form for such purpose.3"' The physician must consider the Jugendlicher's
medical history when determining whether the particular employment will
endanger the youth's health or development, and whether special measures
are required for him. Further, he should state whether he views an
examination after the second one as advisable. °2
The physician also may order a further examination by a specialist if he
deems it prudent. If the physician does so, however, he must state his
reasons in writing.30 3 As with other such examinations, the Land government assumes the costs for this additional physical examination
(Erginzungsuntersuchung,or "supplementary examination"). °4 A doctor's
failure to order additional testing is not punishable under either administrative
or criminal law, 305 but a Jugendlicherwho has sustained an injury allegedly
because of the doctor's negligence would have a breach of contract or tort

293. Id. § 43.
294. See ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 385 (referring to No. 21 of the Empfehlung der
Europaiische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft of Jan. 31, 1967).
295. JArbSchG § 34.
296. ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 386.
297. Id.
298. JArbSchG § 37, 1, sent. 1.
299. Id. § 37, 1, sent. 2.
300. Id. § 39.
301. MOLITOR, supra note 53, at 408.
302. JArbSchG § 37, I 2-3.
303. Id. § 38.
304. MOLITOR, supra note 53, at 407.
305. ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 398.
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action against the physician."
Employer groups have not significantly resisted this elaborate system of
recurrent physical examination, likely because management assumes no cost.
However, there have been no apparent studies on its effectiveness, either
from a result or cost perspective. Until this has been done, the process might
be accurately assessed as an unnecessary expense and bureaucratic detail
which the legislature might do well to consider discontinuing.
2.

Employers' Posting Requirements

The JArbSchG requires any employer who employs at least one
Jugendlicher to make available in a conspicuous place in the work area a
copy of the law and the address of the overseeing Aufsichtsbehrde.07 The
statute permits the employer the option of posting this on a wall or keeping
it on a table, provided it is accessible to the young employee. Those
employers who engage at least three Jugendliche assume the additional
burden of hanging notice of the regular work hours and pauses for these
young workers in a conspicuous place."' 8 This posting is required only of
enterprises (Betriebe), and employers for whom work is done in a household
are excluded. The posting is only imposed on enterprises employing
Jugendliche, not Kinder.3" The utility of these sections is perhaps negligible. There are no statistics documenting the frequency or number of requests
by Jugendliche to see copies of the law, but pragmatism would suggest that
most youthful employees would have little, if any, interest in examining, or
even perusing, it.
Finally, the employer must retain a record of all Jugendliche employed,
including their full names, birthdates, addresses, and date each began
work. 310
This starting work date is the date the Jugendlicher was
scheduled to begin work, regardless of when the contract of employment was
consummated or when he actually commenced his work duties. 31 ' The
following hypothetical exemplifies such a situation: assume that on March
20, an employer and a Jugendlicher entered into an agreement to establish
a work relationship. Although the Jugendlicher was to begin work April 1,
his first day on the job was actually not until April 8 because of a death in
the family. The starting work date for this young employee should be April
1. The statute uses the plural (Verzeichnifie) rather than the singular

306. BGB §§ 823 ff.
307. Id. § 47.

308.
permits
309.
310.
311.

JArbSchG § 48. This must, however, be hung, and there is no discretion which
the employer to place it on a table if he prefers. See ZMARiK, supra note 92, at 427.
ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 422.
JArbSchG § 49.
MOLIrOR, supra note 53, at 458.
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(Verzeichnis) in reference to these records, presumably an indication that the
Bundestag did not intend to require a single, unified list. The employer's
duty is simply to have such a record on each Jugendlicher employed, and
this might be in separate documents.
Further, although the pre-1976 law gave the Jugendlicher the right of
access to his Verzeichnis, 31 2 the present statute requires only that the
employer disclose this information to the Aufsichtsbehdrde.3" 3
The
information is already known by the subject, and the legislature's curtailment
of the employer's duties to divulge the data was an effort to contain
administrative tasks and expenses where possible.31 4
Despite this attempt to defray administrative detail, the Bundestag
apparently did not consider the probable duplicative contents of the
Verzeichnife and the medical report. A simple addition to the physician's
form of the projected starting employment date would consolidate into a
single document the data now comprising two. This would not only provide
unified information on the Jugendlicher's physical status and the statistical
information regarding his employment, should the Aufsichtsbeh6rde want to
see both, but it would also eliminate the need for the employer to retain two
separate reports for each employed Jugendlicher.
3. Prohibition Against Imposing Corporal Punishment upon or Giving
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Products to the Employed Jugendlicher
Section 31 of the law, although brief, has provided abundant commentary. Two seemingly unrelated actions are prohibited for employers in a
single provision. The first deals with corporal punishment, whereas the
second subsection addresses numerous physical and moral hazards.
a. CorporalPunishment
The first subsection of Section 31 forbids an employer from subjecting
31 5
the young worker to corporal punishment as a means of discipline.
Although this appears simply to complement the law which makes the
infliction of any bodily harm punishable as a crime, whether or not in the
employment setting, and whether or not the victim is a minor,31 6 the ban
in the JArbSchG goes far beyond that proscription. The concept of corporal
punishment in the Act encompasses any physical influence whatsoever by the
employer either to force the Jugendlicherto perform a task or to punish him

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

JArbSchG § 58 (1960).
Id. § 50, 1 (1976).
ZMARUK, supra note 92, at 429.
JArbSchG § 31, 1.
StGB, §§ 23 ff.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss2/1

42

19931

UNINTENDED SIBLING LEGISLATION?

Daugherty Rasnic: Unintended Sibling Legislation? Statutory Regulations of Child La

for not having done a task. The Act is violated even if no injury actually
resulted, or if the punishment might objectively be regarded as reasonable if
rendered to an adult worker. Moreover, if the minor's parent or guardian
consents to the employer's act, this section nonetheless has been
violated.317
b. Alcoholic Beverages, Tobacco, and Immoral Environment
The second subsection obligates the employer to prevent others in the
workplace from using corporal punishment on the Jugendlicher. In addition,
the employer itself must not expose the Jugendlicherto what the Bundestag
regards as morally dangerous. However, the duty of the employer to curb
negative influences on the Jugendlicher employee from those in the work
area is nebulous.3 18
This subsection requires that the employer shield the Jugendlicherboth
from dangers of bodily harm and from immoral influences in the work
area.319 Both the scope of persons for whom the employer is responsible
and the breadth of the concept of moral dangers (sittliche Gefdhrdungen) are
extraordinary. The employer is accountable for the acts of other employees,
members of the employer's household, and all persons permitted in the work
area. This duty extends to subordinates, any incidental workers on the
employer's property (such as a gardener), any member of the employer's
family, or anyone the employer has allowed on the premises.320 Should
any transgression occur against the Jugendlicher despite the employer's
precautionary measures, the duty becomes absolute in that it must not recur.
This mandates more than a reprimand from .the employer, because the law
requires that the individual guilty of such inappropriate physical activity or
immoral influence be kept separate from the Jugendlicher. If the work
environment does not make such separation practical or possible, the
employer must discharge the guilty worker.32' Even though German
statutory law considerably restricts the employer's right to terminate an
employee, 32 discharge for such a reason is considered socially permissible
(sozialgerechtfertig)under the statute regulating terminations.323
The "moral hazards" or immoral influences against which the
Jugendlicheris to be protected include sexual advances, objectionable speech,

317. ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 367.

318. See JArbSchG § 22, 2, sent. 1; see also supra note 117. The legislature in this
provision is exercising its parens patriae powers over the younger worker.
319. Id. § 31, 2, sent. 1.
320. ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 369.
321. Id. at 368-69.
322. Kundigungsschutzgesetz § I [KSchG].
323. ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 368.
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or crudeness by a co-worker or associate of the employer.324 This prohibition conjures images of a sexual harassment allegation under Title VII. The
United States Supreme Court has indeed expressly held that unlawful
harassment includes not only harassment with potential economic consequences, but also that which creates a "hostile or abusive work environment.,,325 However, even the expansive language of Title VII is narrower
than that in this section of the JArbSchG.
Title VII prohibits any discrimination by an employer "with respect
to ... compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"
because of an employee's race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.326
The linchpin upon which a Title VII violation hinges is the discriminatory
characteristic of the employment. The treatment also must have been based
on one of the forbidden criteria. Further, the discrimination must be
"sufficiently severe or pervasive" 327 to have actually altered the
employment conditions and to have created a work environment that is
abusive to the employee. The language of Title VII gives an employer clear
notice of what is prohibited treatment, but the JArbSchG's broad ban against
exposing a Jugendlicher to "moral hazards" is so sweeping as to be replete
with ambiguity.
What comprises objectionable speech or "moral dangers" necessarily
differs considerably according to whose objectives or morals are being used
as the standard. In the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court's erratic
efforts to define "obscenity" in response to lawsuits arising out of attempts
by several states to legislate a moral standard provide an example.32 8
Consequently, there are obvious difficulties with enforcing a law with
language such as this section of the JArbSchG. Without a more definitive
and less ambiguous directive, an employer could not be certain as to exactly
what his associates, employees, family members, and licensees are forbidden
from doing.

324. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits sex discrimination in employment.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
325. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
326. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)(1991).
327. Meritor,477 U.S. at 675 (citing and quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972), holding that a "mere utterance of an ethnic or
racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" would not affect his or her
conditions of employment sufficiently to be unlawful under Title VII).
328. In adjudging whether material portraying sexual conduct so as to appeal to the prurient
interest is obscene, the Court earlier applied a fairly broad and lenient standard. As long as
this material was not "utterly without socially redeeming value," it was granted First
Amendment protection. Memoirs v. Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (emphasis supplied).
Seven years later, the Court became less permissive, narrowing acceptable material to that
which contains "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Miller v. Calif., 413
U.S. 15, 27, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2616 (1973) (emphasis supplied).
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A collateral issue in the United States would be the general restraint of
such a law not only on activities, but also on speech, which possibly would
constitute a violation of freedom of expression under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, in particular if the work is in a public area. Limitations on
speech or expression in the United States must be pursuant to a sufficiently
justifiable state interest.329 It is instructive to use again those restrictions
on publication or dissemination of obscene materials in the United States as
a comparative base. It is an accepted principle that there is a public interest
for a state to establish different obscenity standards for minors and
adults. 330
The problem with enforcing the JArbSchG's Section 31,
however, is that it lacks any clear standards. In the United States, if it is not
possible to discern what is being prohibited in a federal or state statute
because of overbroad language, it is unconstitutionally vague and therefore
unenforceable.33 ' This constitutional impediment is not one with which the
German legislature must cope.
The second part of Section 31, paragraph 2, again reverts to restricting
only the employer itself, releasing the employer from responsibility for others
who might engage in these enumerated acts. For instance, an employer is
prohibited from giving a Jugendlicherunder age sixteen any alcoholic drinks
or tobacco products. 332 For the Jugendlicher who is age sixteen or seventeen, the employer is prohibited only from giving him liquor.333 Prior to
1976, however, the law extended the employer's responsibility for the acts
of others in this regard. 3" Regardless of the legislature's intent in making
this change, if a third person gives the minor employee alcohol or tobacco
it would arguably be tantamount to exposing the Jugendlicher to the more
broadly phrased "moral hazard." Consequently, the action would be within
the realm of the employer's accountability in the first part of Section 31,

329. Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court approved the so-called "fighting words" doctrine
when it held that First Amendment protections do not extend to expressions which "by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
330. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Common Sense Newspaper, Inc., 320 N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1971) rev'd on other grounds, 337 N.Y.S.2d 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972).
331. See, e.g., Doe v. University of Mich., 17570 F. Supp. 852, 866 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(striking down a state university policy on such grounds). In Doe, the administration had made
punishable by discipline any "discrimination" or "discriminatory harassment" which created
an "intimidating, hostile or demeaning~environment." The court held the language to be too
vague to give sufficient notice as to what activity is prohibited, or whether it prohibits mere
acts or constitutionally protected speech. Id.
332. Interestingly, the statute expressly forbids giving alcoholic drinks (Getrnke).
Although this restrictive terminology would not include candy with liquor content or foods
cooked in alcohol, such an act has never been challenged under this section. ZMARLIK, supra
note 92, at 370.
333. JArbSchG § 31, 2, sent. 2.
334. Id. § 44 (1960).
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paragraph 2.
A violation of either part of Section 31 carries only civil penalties under
the JArbSchG, but the potential for illegality under other theories is obvious.
Corporal punishment in most situations would be criminally punishable either
as an assault and battery 336 or a physical constraint. 331 Transgressions
under the "offensive words" subsection are also conceivably crimes under the
use of the injurious or insulting words statute. 33' Further, an injured
Jugendlicher would also have a tort claim, 339 including a claim for pain and
suffering (Schmerzengeldanspruch).3 4
The Bundestag is to be lauded for its motives in enacting Section 31.
Nonetheless, because of this statutory repetition in making some criminal acts
punishable through the imposition of civil penalties, the section is plausibly
redundant and therefore unnecessary. 34 ' The absence of such a provision
in the FLSA is easily explicable. First, there is the vagueness problem.
Second, Congress likely would consider such restraints superfluous and
already sufficiently addressed by the states in their exercise of police powers.
IV. CONCLUSION

As is typical in a civil law country,342 Germany's statutory scheme
restricting child labor is decidedly more detailed and prolix than its American
counterpart.34 3 The relative verbosity of the JArbSchG is perhaps best
exemplified in the several sections containing safeguards not mentioned in
the FLSA child labor provisions. 3'
Both governments, however, have
adopted an inordinate amount of supplemental regulatory directives, and the
result in both Germany and the United States is an extensive limitation on the
employment of minors.
The German statute is distinct in that it denounces work which may have
an injurious moral effect on the minor employee. The U.S. Secretary of
Labor's list of occupations or industries constituting illegal "oppressive child

335. See ZMARLIK, supra note 92, at 370.
336. StGB §§ 223 ff.
337. StGB § 240.
338. StGB § 185.
339. BGB §§ 823 if.
340. BGB § 831.
341. The general rule under German law that the criminal penalty alone applies to an act
which is simultaneously punishable under civil law also should considerably undermine any
utility of this section, See StGB § 52.
342. See JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE Civii. LAW TRADITION 32-35 (2d ed. 1985).
343. The JArbSchG is comprised of 72 sections, consuming some 35 pages of text. Only
three sections or subsections of the FLSA directly address child labor alone: §§ 203(1), 212,
and 213(c) & (d). The generally applicable penalty provisions, §§ 216 and 217(d) also
encompass minimum wage and maximum hour violations.
344. See supra part III, section E.
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labor" for those under age eighteen prohibits only those characterized by
physical hazards.
The JArbSchG also devotes much more attention and detail to the
employer's obligations to the Berufsschuler than does the FLSA regulatory
reference to high school vocational training programs. This distinction,
however, is in response to the Bundestag's need to harmonize the work
restrictions with the widely used Berufsschule in the German Ldnder, rather
to any different underlying philosophies.
In most other respects, the two laws contain markedly similar provisions,
and most distinguishing characteristics can be attributed to differences in
governmental structures or style rather than to substance. A study of persons
protected, occupations or activities prohibited for minor workers, severity of
penalties for violations, and positions on work during obligatory school time
shows a paucity of fundamental differences between the JArbSchG and the
FLSA child labor provisions.
These similarities may initially seem
dichotomous, in view of the quite disparate features of German and U.S.
labor law in other respects.
It is probable that the phenomena which gave rise to these two divergent
bodies of labor and employment law in most other areas are not applicable
when the aim of the government is to protect and preserve its youthful
resources. The economic and political contexts which have shaped other
German and American labor laws offer reasons for the two legislatures'
priorities and values. The different treatments of unions and management is
an example. The United States' opportunities for initiative and the
individualism that is inherent in its relatively new-nation status have left their
marks on the collective bargaining process. The United States, as a fledgling
nation, has a natural commitment to free enterprise and unfettered competition, a commitment with no reasonably5 expected parallel in a country such
34
as Germany, with centuries of history.
Also significant in these differences is Germany's situs. During this
century, two major world wars were fought in good part on German soil.
Germany's extensive wage-related social legislation is not only a likely
response to the inflation resulting from these conflicts, but also the residuary
notion that the role of the government is to safeguard the economy for the
people.3" These historical bases conceivably explain the German works
council and codetermination laws which secure labor a voice in management
decision-making. . No such stigma of the ravages of war has influenced
Congress to approve such sweeping legislation solidifying the collective

345. Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84
HARv. L. REv. 1394, 1419 (1971).
346. Id. at 1421.
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powers of labor. Rather, federal lawmakers in the United States have
attempted to equalize the bargaining rights of labor and management and
have focused largely on workers' individual rights.
A second difference is the provision under German law for different
treatment for women and men in the workplace. These laws actually are in
furtherance of the assurance of equality for men and women in the
Grundgesetz.347 The Bundestag's intent was not to grant preferences for
between
women workers, but rather to compensate for physical differences 34
8
equality.
guaranteed
constitutionally
this
achieve
to
the sexes so as
This difference in the general German and American demeanors on the
status of women in the workplace is most starkly evidenced by the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in UAW v. Johnson Controls.349 Johnson
Controls concerned a company's rule disqualifying women with child-bearing
capacity from working in proximity with materials known to be harmful to
an unborn child. The Court held that such a policy violated the woman
worker's right against unlawful sex discrimination, and that this right was not
conditioned upon any possible harm to a fetus. 35" This decision is alien to
the German concept of basic rights, because the Grundgesetz extends basic
protection not only to women in general, but also to women in their capacity
as mothers.35 ' Accordingly, German federal law provides exhaustive
mandatory protective features for the working mother and the child, both
during and after delivery.352 These statutory protections are intended to
complement, not to contradict, the woman's right to equality. This legislative
scheme, long accepted in Germany,3 53 is clearly contrary to the Johnson
Controls decision. However, these legal postures reflect the two countries'
different cultures and histories, which have shaped respective attitudes on
how best to secure women's rights.35
Unlike these examples where the labor laws are so variant, cultural and

347. GG art. 3.
348. See, e.g., PETER MEISEL, ARBEITSSCHULTZ FOR FRAuEN UND MOTTER 11 (1980)
(stating that the average woman's lung capacity and arm strength are less than those of the
average man).
349. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
350. Id. at 1203.
351. GG art. 6(4).
1-2, § 6, 3., 1968 BGBI. I 315.
352. Mutterschutzgesetz (MSchG) § 3,
353. It should be noted that this stance is facing mounting resistance. On its February 21,
1993, broadcast, "Bonn Direkt," a nationally televised news program, reported a growing
number of women who are disturbed over their inability to obtain or keep full-time
employment because of these laws. This is particularly so in the former East Germany, where
unemployment is a severe problem. Although only one-third of the Bundestag representatives
are women, this contingent is hard at work in its battle to alter these statutes, and, if
necessary, to amend the Grundgesetz.
354. See Rasnic, supra note 14, at 445-46.
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historical disparities play no role when the purpose of a law is to assure the
welfare of children. First, the natural subjective inclination to protect the
young is universal, as international programs such as UNICEF exhibit.
Second, in addition to the paternalistic purpose there is an objective
justification for child labor laws. The economist takes the position that the
potential earning power of one not yet developed is best maximized by
investing socially at present in protecting his future human capital.355
These rationales apply without regard to geographic boundaries.
Where both the motivations and the goals for two sovereign nations' laws
are essentially the same, the end product will be understandably similar. This
commonality of objective - to safeguard the young in the labor market has resulted in resemblances rarely found in German and American laws
regulating activity in the employment setting.

355. For a discussion of the evolution of the economic role of the child worker, see
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 138 (1986). See also David Stem et al.,
How Children Used to Work, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93 (1975).
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